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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
THE RIGHT TO ENERGY FOR ALL EUROPEANS COALITION  
A CASE OF GREEN-RED MOBILIZATION 
 
This paper explores the potential for “environmental” (green) and “social” (red) 
European NGOs and trade unions to jointly mobilize, pursuing synergies between 
ecological/environmental and social goals, as well as to drive bottom-up policy 
change at the European Union level. The main research question is thus the fol-
lowing: do European NGOs and trade unions conflict or cooperate on ‘eco-social’ 
challenges? To answer such question, the research focuses on the case of the ‘Right 
to Energy for All Europeans’ coalition. The coalition is an advocacy-oriented alliance 
of European social and green NGOs, as well as trade unions, aimed at eradicating 
energy poverty in Europe, mostly by exerting influence EU’ institutions concern-
ing the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” legislative package. From a methodo-
logical point of view, we rely on literature review and qualitative research methods, 
notably document analysis complemented by several semi-structured interviews 
with the members of the Coalition. We draw two main conclusions. First, bottom-
up coordination is undermined by structural constraints (such as limited resources 
and compartmentalized policymaking), as well as by interest groups’ commitment 
to specific and potentially divergent interests. Indeed, coalition-building is always a 
strategic move and it is more likely to take the form of ad-hoc cooperation, than 
formalized coordination. Nevertheless, European green and social NGOs and 
trade unions display a cooperative attitude towards each other. This is coherent 
with our second finding, according to which these organizations have an incentive 
to cooperate, since they frequently endorse a ‘just transition’ paradigm. Con-
trasting both powerful economic interests and the approach followed by Europe-
an institutions, NGOs and trade unions are promoting a vision for Europe where 
social and environmental goals are harmoniously combined. Green-red alliances 
can thus be seen as bottom-up actions aimed to effectively mainstream ‘just transi-
tion’ into policy demands and political strategies, hence giving their members an 
incentive to join. 
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THE RIGHT TO ENERGY FOR ALL EUROPEANS COALITION 
A CASE OF GREEN-RED MOBILIZATION? 
 
JESSOULA MATTEO AND MANDELLI MATTEO 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While social and environmental issues are increasingly salient on the political 
agenda, the concept of  ‘sustainability’ has become key to address the intertwine-
ment of  the social, the environmental and the economic spheres. The more or less ef-
fective integration between these three dimensions is substantially shaped by the 
political sphere - that is through the interactions of  social, political and institutional 
actors, both on the demand-side (interest groups, voters, citizens, etc..) and the 
supply-side (political parties and institutions). 
   
Since European political elites primarily conceived (and still conceive) the Europe-
an project as a plan for economic – and, then, monetary – integration, the supra-
national political arena is crowded with a dense network of  business-oriented 
pressure groups, mainly animated by growth-enhancing goals. In this context, the 
pursuit of  a ‘sustainable’ combination of  economic, social and environmental pol-
icies is thus a difficult task, requiring the partial de-structuring of  well-entrenched 
political relations, power positions and related policymaking patterns. To this aim, 
the bottom-up mobilization of  supranational civil society organizations and trade 
unions may play a key role in raising awareness, enhancing participation, support-
ing sector-specific interests, as well as improving policy monitoring and the overall 
delivery on environmental/ecological and social issues (‘eco-social’ issues).  
  
While cross-sector mobilization may be beneficial for eco-social objectives, several 
factors lean towards the enduring compartmentalization of  both policymaking and 
actor mobilization at the EU level. The aim of  this working paper is to study in-
terest group cross-sectoral mobilization in the European Union, by focusing on 
the Right to Energy for All Europeans. By investigating interactions and potential con-
flicts between green/environmental and red/social non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), as well as trade unions, the study aims to assess the potential for 
these organizations to influence policy change and to generate harmonious com-
binations of  social and environmental objectives. We label such mobilization 
‘green-red’ or as ‘eco-social’ mobilization, that is ecological and social mobiliza-
WP-LPF 1/19 • ISBN 978-88-94960-13-6 6 
tion.t 
Non-governmental organizations and trade unions, acting as network-based advo-
cacy groups, are thus the subject of  the research. In particular, the study does not 
address the impact of  their activities, rather focusing on aspects such as their val-
ues, positions, objectives, strategies and methods of  action, as well as on their in-
teractions – be either cooperative or conflictual – within the coalitions they form.  
 
The research method is predominantly qualitative: in addition to secondary litera-
ture review and analysis of  institutional and non-institutional documents, the re-
search relies on seven semi-structured interviews1 with the member of  the Right to 
Energy for All Europeans coalition.  
 
In order to contextualize the case study, the underpinning analytical framework is 
presented in Section 2, which presents the so-called ‘eco-social-growth trilemma’ 
and the role of  politics in addressing such trilemma. The analytical framework is 
then applied to the EU context in Section 3. First, the social, environmental and 
economic dimensions of  the EU are presented and then the analytical framework 
is used to interpret a recent legislative initiative, the “Clean Energy for All Europe-
ans” package, which was selected because it addresses, among others, the multidi-
mensional issue of  energy poverty in the EU. In section 4, the paper analyzes lob-
bying in the EU, also reviewing the literature investigating the potential to cooper-
ate and/or conflict for European NGOs and trade unions. Finally, section 5 ad-
dresses the case study, that is the green-red mobilization occurred in the context 
of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition, while section 6 compares social 
and environmental European interest groups. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE ECO-SOCIAL-GROWTH TRILEMMA AND 
THE ROLE OF POLITICS 
 
Drawing from the so-called ‘triple bottom line’ literature2 (O’Connor 2007; Ravi 
Nayak and Venkatraman 2015), it is possible to postulate the existence of  three 
different systems (or spheres), that is economic, social and environmental, which 
inevitably and dynamically interact in a way that makes it meaningless to treat any 
sphere in isolation from the others (O’Connor 2007). This happens for two rea-
sons. First, these spheres are not mere theoretical constructions, but rather proper 
systems, which are inherently interconnected. Indeed any economic activity func-
tions within a social sphere, which is itself  embedded in the biosphere. Moreover, 
safeguarding the integrity of  each of  these realms is necessary for the others to 
function properly (O’Connor 2007). For instance, environmental degradation3 can 
 
1 See the full interview list at the bottom.  
2 The ‘triple bottom line’ literature is a normative approach to the theory of sustainability. 
3 Environmental degradation is defined as the deterioration of the environment through 
the depletion of natural resources, the disruption of natural habitats and pollution (Johnson et 
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be seen as negative externality of  economic production and it may in turn gener-
ate needs and demands to increase social protection benefits4 for the victims of  
ecological dysfunctions. 
Each sphere is thus conceptualized as separate yet highly interconnected organiza-
tional form, characterized by elements of  self-preservation and self-organization. 
Political claims arise from each sphere independently. An issue is “political” if  
there are actors - being them politicians, social partners, civil society organizations, 
political parties, academics, etc. - that put forward claims regarding the issue itself, 
with the aim to influence public policies, by promoting their interests or views 
(O’Connor 2007). Political claims regarding the economic, ecological and social 
spheres reflect the performance goals inherent in each sphere. The economic sys-
tem promotes economic growth5, i.e. the maximization of  output, exchange and 
consumption, with the aim to produce as much wealth as possible. In the social 
sphere, in turn, individuals self-organize into communities by means of  collective 
identities (O’Connor 2007). The ultimate social imperative is to redistribute re-
sources properly among members of  these communities, in order to enhance their 
well-being and achieve social cohesion and social justice6. Finally, the environmen-
tal sphere places ecological considerations at the center of  its self-organization 
(Meadowcroft 2005), with the goal to preserve the dynamic structures at the basis 
of  natural activities7 - either physical ones, thus regarding energy and matter, or 
biological ones - for the sake of  human prosperity (O’Connor 2007). Political 
claims often concern the role that every sphere plays, or should play, in relation to 
another, meaning that these demands may rise as consequence of  the interde-
pendencies existing between separate domains (O’Connor 2007).  
Given the many interrelations between spheres and the many salient cross-cutting 
issues at the center of  the political agenda, both the supply and the demand of  
public policies are often determined evaluating trade-offs and synergies among 
 
al. 1997).  If brought to the extreme, in the long-run, environmental degradation could harm 
not only human activities and their operating space, but also people’s safety and ultimately, the 
survival of the human species. Therefore, environmental changes affect human beings in sev-
eral potentially harmful ways. 
4 Taking care of individuals’ needs and risks is usually perceived as a public responsibility, 
since they represent the main obstacles to individuals’ life chances and well-being. Social policy 
is the branch of public policy that has to do with citizens’ welfare and hence with issues related 
to the living conditions, resources, chances and opportunities available to each in the various 
phases of life cycle (Ferrera 2006). 
5 Economic growth, commonly measured as the increase in total or per-capita output pro-
duced by an economic system over time (Turner, Pearce and Bateman 1996), is often – yet 
perhaps mistakenly - seen as a necessary condition for societies to achieve individuals’ prosper-
ity (Koch and Fritz 2014 b). 
6 The welfare state is the institutional framework designed to achieve the performance 
goals inherent in the social sphere. In the period of its maximum expansion, the European wel-
fare model was characterized by an almost-universal inclusion of beneficiaries, a wide catalogue 
of covered risks and needs and the promotion of fairness and efficiency (Ceraolo 2011). 
7 The reference here is to the so-called planetary boundaries, i.e. nine processes described 
by scientists as critical for the stability of the Earth system. 
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various political interests and objectives. The ‘eco-social-growth trilemma’ specifi-
cally refers to the condition of  political actors - institutional and non-institutional 
ones - facing a decision about which performance goals related to the economic, 
the social or the environmental (or ecological) spheres should be respected and/or 
pursued (O’Connor 2007).  
A key aspect of  the trilemma is the role played by economic growth, which seem-
ingly generates contradictions between social and environmental objectives. On 
the one hand, social policies were designed as distributional adjustment to free 
markets and economic growth and, as such, it do not question neo-liberal pattern 
per se, rather aiming at complementing them (Meadowcroft 2005; Midgley and 
Tang 2001). On the other hand, environmental agreements, taxes, subsides, regula-
tions and prohibitions aim at addressing the negative ecological externalities of  
economic activities (Meadowcroft 2005), thus challenging the traditional concep-
tion of  an unbounded and unlimited economic growth (Meadows, Meadows, 
Rander and Behrens III 1972; Arrow et al. 2004). For the growth path to be envi-
ronmentally sustainable, production and consumption must be kept within the 
limits that the planetary system can sustain (Brock and Taylor 2005; Meadowcroft 
2005), whereas economic growth is necessary to enhance distributional justice, be-
cause it delivers the resources to grant the financial soundness of  welfare systems 
(Midgley and Tang 2001).  
However, solving the eco-social-growth trilemma does not necessarily mean 
choosing between divergent goals. Public policies may in fact be designed for the 
simultaneous achievement of  potentially conflicting objectives8, which is the case 
of  equitable, viable and bearable strategies. A strategy, a policy or even an industrial 
plan is equitable when it produces strong performances with respect to fighting 
poverty and unemployment, enhancing equality and social justice, while also in-
creasing production, consumption, income and exchange levels (Barbier 1987; Slo-
cum 2015). Viable policies and practices are instead designed to simultaneously 
promote environmental and economic goals, hence neglecting their possible social 
downturns. Enhancing resource efficiency and controlling carrying capacities in 
periods of  economic growth are examples of  viable initiatives (Barbier 1987; Slo-
cum 2015). The area of  intersection between environmental and social goals is 
bearability (Barbier 1987; Slocum 2015). Bearable policies pursue both eco-social 
justice and sustainability by taking into account the social implications of  envi-
ronmental initiatives and viceversa. A notable example of  such measures is climate 
mitigation policies, which have always given rise to distributional dilemmas, hence 
requiring the adoption of  countervailing social policies9 (Gough 2013). In the 
 
8 Both the triple bottom line theory and O’Connor’s (2007) four spheres approach, which 
serve to build the analytical foundations of this study, are normative constructs that imply a 
judgement about what principles shall be respected and, as such, they aim to orient public deci-
sion-making by establishing what is desirable and what is not (O’Connor 2007). They both en-
dorse the simultaneous maximization of economic, social and environmental goals. 
9 Members of different segments of the society have both different responsibilities for en-
vironmental degradation and they also suffer different environmental impacts (Gough 2013). 
Some authors talk about a “double injustice” (Koch and Fritz 2014 a), as the subset of popula-
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bearable scenario, nature and societies are well established, but the economic activ-
ity could be scarce or underdeveloped (Barbier 1987; Slocum 2015). Deprioritizing 
economic growth means conceptualizing development as a synonym of  prosperi-
ty: the combination of  ecological sustainability10, social inclusion11 and individual 
well-being12 (Koch and Fritz 2014 b). Sustainability is the ideal intersection of  the 
equitable, the viable and the bearable subsets, and it hence imply pursuing the con-
temporaneous maximization of  economic, ecological and social performance 
goals.  
 
O’Connor (2007) adds a fourth sphere to those identified by the triple bottom line 
approach, which is the realm of  systemic regulation through political organization, 
i.e. the political sphere. The author in facts refers to a tetrahedral model, where the 
political sphere, just like the other three, is a proper system not to be considered 
relevant in isolation - despite having its own self-organization and relying on its 
own principles for performance and quality - but rather for its interdependency 
with the other realms. The political sphere has to do with power, interests and in-
stitutions. It functions through those institutional arrangements, principles and 
normative instruments, which regulate societal claims and policy outcomes. The 
political sphere is designed to execute a double function, in the pursuit of  manag-
ing the interactions between the three realms of  sustainability. First, different po-
litical actors, or stakeholders, representing specific interests or segments of  the 
population, put forward specific claims with a view to achieve their own objec-
tives13. Then, the duty of  governmental activities is to channel all these political 
demands throughout institutions, procedures and conventions and to use these 
channels to arbitrage between different claims in relation to one another, hence 
making choices and supplying policy outcomes. The fact that political claims might 
 
tion most likely to be more affected by environmental externalities is usually less responsible 
for pollution and resource depletion and it has less resources to cope with these negative 
downturns (Koch and Fritz 2014 a; Gough 2013). Therefore, these authors have called for the 
development of new investment-focused eco-social policies, capable to modify preferences and 
behaviors and to constraint consumption and production demands (Gough 2013). 
10 Ecological sustainability is operationalized by taking into account two indicators: 
CO2 emissions per capita and the ecological footprint of consumption of a country (Koch and 
Fritz 2014 b).  
11 Social inclusion is measured in terms of equity, cohesion and civic participation (Koch 
and Fritz 2014 b).   
12 Individual well-being is a measure of the quality of life and its value depends, among 
others, on the two variables affecting prosperity, i.e. social inclusion and ecological sustainabil-
ity (Koch and Fritz 2014 b).   
13 Political claims often derive more from ideal principles, rather than sector-specific inter-
ests. It is undeniable, especially in relation to post-industrial political issues, such as environ-
mental degradation, that ideas and principles are capable to mobilize support around them with 
the aim of shaping the public agenda and proposing strategies for social reform (Meadowcroft 
2005). 
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be conflictual is embedded in the nature of  politics and power14.  
In short, if  we were to draw a vector that sketches the relationships between the 
political sphere and the other ones, it would look like a bi-directional arrow, repre-
senting both policy demand and policy supply. For instance, economic actors pro-
pose demands, supported by appropriate arguments, concerning the economic 
domain, but also affecting the social and the environmental spheres, and the gov-
ernment holds the responsibility to respond with normative outcomes that may or 
may not embrace these claims (O’Connor 2007). The ‘welfare’ state represents the 
politico-administrative system that delivers social provisions (Meadowcroft 2005) 
and regulates the interactions between the social and the political spheres15. The 
same mechanism is valid when it comes to the environmental sphere, even though 
the ‘ecological state’ is arguably less developed than the welfare state16.  
Once again, it is important to keep in mind that the political sphere is isolated only 
in theory. In reality, stakeholders work simultaneously with each other because 
many, if  not all, political issues crosscut different domains and policymakers ulti-
mately make their choices having in mind the perspectives that different stake-
holders present them.  
What is relevant for this research is how policy demands are shaped by various po-
litical actors representing interests form different sectors. Thus, it is focused on 
the demand side of  the political sphere. In particular, it aims to assess the potential 
for social actors in the social and in the environmental sphere to go beyond their 
established structures and interests in order to prompt virtuous combination be-
tween their respective demands, and ultimately drive a bottom-up and sustainable 
political change. 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Cleavages form when the interests of different subsets of the same society diverge. 
Cleavages may reach a point of politicization when they become highly salient and when some 
actors start mobilizing around them, thus creating political parties, trade unions, civil society 
organizations, etc., to represent certain claims in the political arena (Westinen 2015). 
15 The welfare state sets off public interventions to supply social protection in the form of 
social assistance, security and insurance (Ferrera 2006). It describes the set of governmental 
programmes, bureaucratic apparatus and ideological justifications through which the State 
manages its responsibility to deliver social policies to its citizens (Meadowcroft 2005). 
16 The ecological - or eco - state denotes government programmes, practices, activities, re-
sponsible institutions and politico-ideological frameworks, all designed to achieve environmen-
tal sustainability. If compared to the welfare state, the eco state is arguably more underdevel-
oped. Environmental questions came to the public attention perhaps too recently to be fully 
translated into sound political cleavages and green claims do not relate to the immediate mate-
rial interests of any subset of the population. However, green political actors keep working for 
their ideas and they are very much present in the public debate, sometimes achieving impres-
sive results in terms of political influence. The supposed weakness of national eco states might 
explain why ecological issues are often handled at an international or supra-national level 
(Meadowcroft 2005). 
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3. APPLYING THE TRILEMMA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
3.1. THE ECO-SOCIAL-GROWTH TRILEMMA AND THE EU 
  
The European Union (EU), with its peculiar supranational configuration, is the 
delimiting space for this research. Within the EU, different actors have tried to 
promote social and environmental goals, facing difficulties related to EU’s lack of  
full competence17 in these fields and to the fact that such goals have largely been 
framed in the context of  EU’s economic policy.  
In the history of  European integration, the economy is the policy area that has 
registered the most significant progress. The idea of  economic and monetary inte-
gration is based on EU-wide coordination and supervision over national macroe-
conomic policies, as well as on the creation and management of  a large internal 
market - supposedly more efficient and competitive. This approach used to be 
considered - almost unanimously - beneficial for Member States, implying positive 
spillovers in terms of  economic stability and growth (Prisecaru 2015). Monetary 
integration additionally created a political space, called ‘Eurozone’, in which some 
Member States share a single currency and are bounded by a common monetary 
policy (Prisecaru 2015). In the original conceptualization, by delegating (or upload-
ing) to Brussels the responsibility for national macroeconomic and monetary gov-
ernance, Member States would have more resources to redistribute in order to 
support their citizens’ living standards and to finance national structural reforms18 
(Prisecaru 2015). Furthermore, EU-wide coordination in the economic sphere has 
been considered desirable and successful in light of  the high interdependence be-
tween European economies.  
The process of  European integration - i.e. of  transferring policy competences to 
the supra-national level - has been weaker in other policy areas, such as social and 
environmental policies. The core of  social protection policies largely remains a 
competence of  Member States, enforcing a principle of  mutual non-interference 
between the two goals of  making - supra-nationally - and correcting – nationally - 
 
17 Within the European Union, a multi-level governance model exists, such that European 
citizens are bounded by national, regional and supra-national policies. The way competences 
for different policy areas are distributed among various levels is defined by national constitu-
tions and by those international treaties that govern the functioning of the European Union. 
The EU can only act within the limits of its competences, as conferred by the Treaties. There 
are three kinds of competences: exclusive ones, i.e. areas in which the EU has the power to 
adopt binding legislation on its own; shared competence, for which both the EU and EU 
countries are able to legislate, provided that they respect the principles of subsidiary and pro-
portionality; and supporting competences, according to which the EU can only act in support, 
or to complement and coordinate Member State’s actions (Daniele 2014). 
18 The responsibility for EU economic governance is nowadays shared between EU institu-
tions and Member States, the latter of which are left with the task to set “their national budgets 
within agreed limits for deficit and debt, and determine their own structural policies involving 
labor, pensions and capital markets” (Prisecaru 2015, 22). 
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the market (Ferrera 2008). When it comes to hard law19 provisions in the field of  
social policies, the Union largely adopts regulative measures20, designed to serve as 
counterparts to its economic strategy21 (Ferrera 2008). The EU has thus inter-
vened in the welfare sector mostly through soft law and coordinated strategies.  
On the contrary, EU environmental policy has bloomed over the years (Fu 2008). 
Through the adoption of  several ‘Environmental Action Programmes’22 and vari-
ous treaty reforms23, as well as through broad secondary legislation24, EU institu-
tions have progressively assumed a more prominent role in environmental protec-
tion (COR 2015). Unlike social issues, environmental themes and challenges are 
inherently international, since cross-border governance and coordination facilitate 
the achievement of  such goals (Meadowcroft 2005). Perhaps for this reason, the 
European Union has been seen as a potentially effective platform for international 
environmental policies to expand over the years (Burns and Tobin 2016; Fu 2008).  
Therefore, despite being both matters of  shared competence between EU institu-
tions and Member States25, EU environmental legislation has developed more sig-
 
19   The policy instruments that European institutions may put in place can be distinguished 
into two main categories: hard and soft laws (European Union website). Hard laws are norms 
that are considered compulsory for Member States to adopt or to translate into their own legis-
lation and they include the principles in the treaties, directives, regulations, decisions and sen-
tences by the Court of justice of the European Union. Soft laws, on the other hand, are non-
binding actions directed to Member States mainly as suggestions and they include opinions, 
recommendations, coordination processes and other kind of acts. 
20 While distributive and re-distributive policies assign resources either for specific func-
tions or to specific groups, regulative policies mainly establish a set of rules that apply to the 
behavior of certain social categories (Nugent 2011). 
21 Examples of binding communitarian social norms are those concerning the free move-
ment of workers, equal treatment in national social security systems, health and safety at work, 
working conditions, gender equality and non-discrimination (Ferrera 2008 I). 
22 Environmental Action Programmes are multi-annual policy frameworks defying princi-
ples and actions to deliver on communitarian environmental policies. The first one, named 
“Communication on Action of the European Communities on the Environment” was adopted 
in 1973 by the European Commission. The first three Programmes lacked appropriate legal 
support and were hence treated more as the synthesis of EU’s general attitude towards the en-
vironment. The 7th Environment Action Programme will be guiding European environment 
policy until 2020 and will be sustained by the adoption of different pieces of legislation (Euro-
pean Commission website b). 
23 Through its articles, the “Lisbon Treaty” provides a solid legal basis for EU environmen-
tal policy: “articles 3(3), 21(2)(d) of the TEU and Articles 4(2)(d), 11, 114, and Title XX on the 
Environment, including Articles 191 – 193, of the TFEU are the primary sources of EU legis-
lation” (COR 2015, 2). 
24 Since the 1970s, the EU has adopted a wide range of secondary legislation on a various 
range of topics including waste disposal, air and water quality, noise pollution, safety of chemi-
cals, biodiversity and natural quality, wildlife and plants’ protection and CO2 emissions reduc-
tion (COR 2015; Wysokińska 2016). Several complementary policies, soft law instruments and 
projects, including the LIFE+ or the Natura 2000 Programmes, have been put in place in order 
to pursue EU’s environmental objectives. 
25 See footnote 19. 
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nificantly than social policy. According to the principle of  subsidiarity26, in matters 
of  shared competence the EU can only act if  Member States are not able to 
achieve their policy objectives on their own, i.e. when such goals may be reached 
more efficiently at the EU level, which was the case for environmental policy 
(Daniele 2014; Modiga 2012). The proportionality principle, on the other hand, 
makes sectoral integration in areas of  shared jurisdiction only possible at the dis-
cretion of  all Member States (Daniele 2014), which explains why European social 
policy has not developed as much as environmental one, i.e. for lack of  political 
willingness. 
 
Despite asymmetrical progress, one could argue that EU’s social and environmen-
tal policies were both conceived under the umbrella of  its economic strategy, i.e. in 
the pursuit of  economic efficiency. On the one hand, supranational social policy 
was developed to regulate the social effects generated by the construction of  an 
internal market, and, thus, it ultimately drew its legitimacy from EU’s duty to pur-
sue economic efficiency (Daly 2006). On the other hand, the impressive develop-
ment of  community environmental legislation was a direct effect of  Member 
States giving mandate to legislate to the EU, considering it the most appropriate 
politico-institutional arena to deal with the negative environmental externalities in-
evitably created in the pursuit of  EU’s competitive interests (Kelemen 2010). The 
welfare state and the ecological state therefore constitute a response to possible 
failures of  voluntary action and free markets (Meadowcroft 2005). At the EU lev-
el, however, the separation of  competences makes it difficult to intervene in the 
social and environmental spheres in order to effectively counterbalance fiscal and 
economic strategies.  
In recent years, the Union has aimed to implement coordinated strategies in policy 
areas that do not necessarily fall into its exclusive competences. Coordinated strat-
egies rely on soft-law governance tools containing communitarian objectives in 
various policy fields aimed at pushing Member States to adopt measures in ac-
cordance with such goals. Coordination rests on the idea of  reform interdepend-
encies, i.e. that a reform adopted at the national level would be more successful if  
undertaken simultaneously both in other EU Countries (between-countries effect) 
and in other connected policy areas (within-Country effect) (Rosenbaum 2010). 
This seemingly happens for several reasons: coordination is supposed to enhance 
policy learning27, to push Member States’ legislation further and faster than nor-
mal and to enhance spillovers and complementarities28 (Rosenbaum 2010). Coor-
dinated strategies such as the “Lisbon Strategy”29 or “Europe 2020”30 are im-
 
26 The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality serve as normative foundations for the 
exercise of EU competences (Daniele 2014; Modiga 2012). 
27 Policy learning refers to an exchange of information regarding best practices to learn 
from and mistakes to avoid (Rosenbaum 2010). 
28 Spillovers are the one-directional negative or positive effects of a certain reform, while 
complementarities are bi-directional effects between different reforms (Rosenbaum 2010). 
29 Launched in March 2000, the “Lisbon Strategy” was a ten-year plan to make the Union 
“the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sus-
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portant because they include the Union’s environmental and social performance 
goals – though not constituting binding pieces of  legislation - and, more im-
portantly, they have established governance mechanisms to achieve such goals in 
an integrated way and under the umbrella of  the EU’s economic framework.  
“Europe 2020” – same as the previous “Lisbon Strategy” - thus represents the 
most prominent instrument through which the EU has tried to integrate environ-
mental and social policies, directly addressing the eco-social-growth trilemma.  
Through coordinated strategies, the Union aims to push member states to comply 
with high social and environmental standards, despite always linking such a strate-
gy to the pursuit of  economic and financial goals (Natali 2010). EU-wide coordi-
nated strategies therefore address the “trilemma” by promoting a model of  eco-
nomic growth that should be socially and environmentally just and sustainable. 
Therefore, since coordinated strategies contain the overall political agenda of  the 
Union, at least on paper the EU appears to be committed to economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. 
 
This research examines how the EU deals with the integration of  - or conflicts be-
tween - social and environmental goals. Coordinated strategies are often criticized 
not only for lack of  social and environmental ambitions, but also for not clearly 
defining how to achieve overarching objectives in a coherent and integrated way31 
(Pochet 2010). Therefore, examining binding pieces of  legislation, instead of  soft-
 
tainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Council of 
the European Union 2000). The strategy was primarily designed for reasons related to eco-
nomic competitiveness (Natali 2010). However, when implemented, the “Lisbon Strategy” rep-
resented the most ambitious attempt to promote a socially, environmentally and economically 
sustainable model of growth (Ivan-Ungureanu and Marcu 2006). The strategy was supplement-
ed by a wide set of policy tools, including funds, regulations and stakeholders’ dialogue proce-
dures (Natali 2010). The so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was the main gov-
ernance instrument designed to supplement the “Lisbon Strategy” (Ivan-Ungureanu and Mar-
cu 2006; Natali 2010).  The OMC approach was mainly based on benchmarking and targets, 
which States commit to meet with the means they consider the most appropriate, thus, without 
being constricted by any binding implementation method (Ivan-Ungureanu and Marcu 2006). 
30 In 2010, one year after the “Treaty of Lisbon” entered into force, the European Com-
mission launched “Europe 2020”, with the view to renew the “Lisbon Strategy”. “Europe 
2020” is a strategy to turn the European economy into a smart, sustainable and inclusive one 
(European Commission 2010) and the so-called European Semester is the governance process 
designed to deliver on the strategy’s objectives. The document issued by the European Com-
mission includes five headline targets, seven flagship initiatives, a set of policies concerning the 
internal market and the “Stability and Growth Pact” and, finally, a section defining the actual 
governance of the strategy (Pochet 2010). The five targets that “Europe 2020” identifies range 
from social goals, to environmental ones and they also address education, research and devel-
opment. Flagship initiatives are key suggestions put forward by the European Commission for 
Member States to underpin the delivery of each target. The European Semester aims at monitor-
ing the progresses and the active involvement of Member States with the strategy itself (Hvin-
den and Halvorsen 2016, Jessoula and Madama 2018). 
31 Some authors argue that the governance processes related to coordinated strategies, in 
fact, seemingly lack effective implementation and democracy (Pochet 2010). 
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law instruments, could be promising in order to assess how the EU concretely 
deals with the trilemma and, consequently, and whether the Union concretely pur-
sue sustainability.  
 
3.2. THE “CLEAN ENERGY FOR ALL EUROPEANS” LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 
   
The piece of  legislation selected to assess the linkages between social and envi-
ronmental policies at the EU level is the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” pack-
age, also referred to as the “Winter package”, or simply as ‘the package’. It was 
launched on 30 November 2016 by the European Commission as part of  its work 
program for the same year (European Commission 2016 b). The package came as 
an initiative by the President of  the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, who 
launched the idea of  an Energy Union32 after his election in 2014 and made it one 
of  the ten priorities for his mandate (Ringel and Knodt 2018).  
The “Winter Package” aims at bringing “EU energy legislation in line with the 
2030 climate and energy targets33, as well as to contribute to the 2015 energy un-
ion strategy goal of  ensuring a secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable en-
ergy supply in the EU” (European Parliament 2017, 2). The proposal by the Eu-
ropean Commission contains over 4500 pages, comprising legislative measures of  
various kind, as well as communications and documents of  different nature (Rin-
gel and Knodt 2018; European Commission 2016 b). The proposals aim to con-
tribute to the transitioning of  the EU economy towards clean forms of  energy 
(European Commission 2016 b). The transition shall be consumer-centered (Rajal, 
Schiebel and Dizdarevic 2016), and it shall benefit the overall economic situation 
of  the Union by boosting employment creation, growth and innovative business 
models in new economic sectors (European Commission 2016 b). The package 
sets goals for the coming decades that go in the direction of  a de-carbonization of  
the economy and Europeanisation of  energy policies. It establishes a governance 
framework aimed to achieve more ambitious policy outcomes and to improve co-
ordination among Member States in the energy field (Ringel and Knodt 2018).  
Even though the proposal of  the Commission aims at harmonizing energy and 
climate policies throughout the Union, the package only establishes broad EU-
 
32 In 2014 Juncker asked Vice-Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Commissioner for Cli-
mate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete to work on a draft proposal for the Energy Union. 
In February 2015, The Commission already presented a communication entitled “Energy Un-
ion Package, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy” (European Commission 2015). The document introduced a vision for 
an Energy Union that would ensure secure, sustainable and competitive energy supply (Ringel 
and Knodt 2018). In March 2015, the Council adopted the proposal of the European Commis-
sion, which highlights five interconnected dimensions: energy security, solidarity and trust; a 
fully integrated European energy market; energy efficiency contributing to the modernization 
of demand; decarburization of the economy; research, innovation and competitiveness (Ringel 
and Knodt 2018). 
33 Within Junker’s Energy Union strategy, in 2014 EU countries have agreed on a “New 2030 
Framework for climate and energy, including EU-wide targets and policy objectives for the pe-
riod between 2020 and 2030” (European Commission website c). 
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wide goals and it does not prescribe binding national targets to deliver on such 
goals (Ringel and Knodt 2018). Article 194 of  the “Lisbon Treaty”, which serves 
as the legal basis for the Commission’s proposal, does not provide European insti-
tutions with specific competences over national energy policies (Ringel and Knodt 
2018). Moreover, some authors have underlined how disagreements between 
North-Western EU Member States and Central-Eastern ones have perhaps pre-
vented the Commission from being more ambitious in the energy sector34 (Ringel 
and Knodt 2018).  
 
The legislative proposals in the package cover several areas and policy fields35. Its 
policy instruments range from regulatory and non-regulatory measures to political 
targets and facilitating measures. They can both be newly-drafted pieces of  legisla-
tion or amendments to existing laws. The European Commission has highlighted 
that measures and amendments within the package shall pursue three main goals: 
“putting energy efficiency first”, “achieving global leadership in renewable ener-
gies” and “providing a fair deal for consumers” (European Commission 2016 b, 
3).  
The first goal36 implies that Member States shall make sure that the cleanest and 
cheapest forms of  energy are taken into account into energy demand management 
strategies and that investment in energy efficient37 infrastructures is actively pro-
moted (European Commission 2016 b). The proposals regarding renewable ener-
gy38 cover six key areas of  intervention: further deploying renewables in the elec-
tricity sector; increasing renewables in the heating and cooling sector; decarboniz-
ing and diversifying the carbon sector; empowering renewable self-consumers; im-
proving sustainability criteria for bioenergy; and achieving timely and cost-
effective EU targets (Rajal, Schiebel and Dizdarevic 2016). The third political goal 
of  the package is instead centered on the consumers’ side. The package aims at 
 
34 The Central-Eastern Member States of the EU have promoted for a long time the prin-
ciple of State sovereignty over the choices of national energy mix (Ringel and Knodt 2018). 
35 The proposals in the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package cover issues such as 
“energy efficiency, renewable energy, the design of the electricity market, security of supply 
and governance rules for the Energy Union” (European Commission 2016 b, 3). 
36 Among the provisions set up to achieve the goal of “putting energy efficiency first”, the 
European Commission set a binding EU-wide target at 30% (increased at 32.5% after trilo-
gies); it proposed to extend beyond 2020 the energy saving obligations for energy producers 
and distributors; and it proposed to strengthen previous provisions on long-term building ren-
ovation strategies, with a view to reduce fuel use in the building stock (European Commission 
2016 b). 
37 Energy efficiency refers to reductions in the amount of energy used to provide for prod-
ucts and services. 
38 In its initial proposal, the European Commission decided to set a target of at least 27% 
for the share of renewable energy consumption to be achieved by 2030, increased at 32% after 
the trilogues. It also issued proposals in order to avoid discrimination against renewables in the 
energy market and to allow alternative energy producers to access this market. Furthermore, it 
extended EU sustainability criteria to cover all types of bioenergy (European Commission 2016 
b). 
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reforming the energy market by empowering and better informing customers on 
their consumption patterns. This would be possible through initiatives that in-
crease energy prices transparency; the creation of  a decentralized and technologi-
cally advanced energy market, as well as through the direct involvement of  con-
sumers in production processes, for example via energy cooperatives (European 
Commission 2016 b). In the section regarding consumer protection, the package 
also includes the goal of  reducing energy poverty in the EU. 
Alongside documents of  other natures, the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” 
package is composed of  eight legislative proposals (see Box 1 for details), four 
regulations and four directives39. Each of  these proposals has followed a separate 
legislative process, all undergoing the ordinary European legislative process40, 
meaning that the initial policy proposal by the European Commission has been 
deferred to the European Parliament41 and the Council of  the European Union 
for them to eventually amend it, negotiate it and, finally, adopt it. Furthermore, 
they all have been subject to a consultation process involving stakeholders, Na-
tional Parliaments, The European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of  Regions. ‘Trilogues’ between the two co-legislators and the Europe-
an Commission started on 18 and 19 December 2017, when the Council issued 
some press releases announcing that it was ready to start the negotiations with the 
Parliament (Council of  the European Union 2017 a; Council of  the European Un-
ion 2017 b; Council of  the European Union 2017 c; Council of  the European Un-
ion 2017 d; Council of  the European Union 2017 e).  
 
 
 
39 A regulation is an act that must be applied in its entirety across the EU, whereas a deci-
sion is only binding for those to whom it is addressed, usually Member States. A directive, on 
the other hand is also a binding legislative act, but it only sets out a general goal for all EU 
Countries, which are then responsible to implement national laws in order to comply with the 
objectives (European Union website). 
40 The ordinary legislative process in the EU should overall take a period of approximately 
eighteen months (Ringel and Knodt 2018). It envisages co-decision power between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of the European Union. First, the proposals is drafted by the 
European Commission and presented to the other EU institution, then both the Council and 
the Parliament are given the possibility to adopt the text at any of the three readings planned. 
Because the same text has to be adopted by both institutions, the co-legislators are given the 
possibility to compromise on an agreed draft through the so-called ‘trilogues’. In case the 
Council is not willing to accept all the amendments proposed by the Parliament at second 
reading, negotiations between the two institutions starts in the framework of a ‘Conciliation 
Committee’. 
41 With respect to the legislative process within the European Parliament, the proposals in 
the “Winter Package” were referred to the Industry, Research and Energy Committee, except for 
the “Proposal for a Regulation on the Energy Union”, which was assigned to the above-
mentioned committee and to the Environment, Public Health, Food Safety Committee, both hold-
ing joint responsibility. The Committees were responsible for drafting a report about each of 
the Commission’s proposals. These reports were subsequently submitted for adoption in the 
plenary session of the European Parliament. 
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Box 1 
Pieces of  legislation in the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package42: 
 
• Regulation on “the Energy Union” or “Governance” Regulation (European 
Commission 2016 f);  
• Regulation on “risk-preparedness in the electricity sector” (European Com-
mission 2016 g);  
• Regulation “establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of  
Energy Regulators” (European Commission 2016 h);  
• Directive on “the energy performance of  buildings” or “EPBD” (European 
Commission 2016 c);  
• Directive on “the promotion of  the use of  energy from renewable sources” or 
“RED” (European Commission 2016 d);  
• Directive on “common rules for the internal market in electricity” or “Elec-
tricity” Directive (European Commission 2016 e);  
• Regulation on “the internal market for electricity” or “Electricity” Regulation 
(European Commission 2016 i);  
• Directive on “energy efficiency” or “EED” (European Commission 2016 a). 
 
At the moment of  writing (October 2018), the state of  play of  the legislative pro-
posals is as follows. The Directive on “the energy performance of  buildings” was 
adopted by both co-legislators and published in the Official Journal in 
19/06/2018. In June 2018, EU co-legislators reached an agreement following in-
ter-institutional negotiations on the Directive on “the promotion of  the use of  
energy from renewable sources”, the Directive on “energy efficiency” and the 
“Governance” Regulation, all of  which still have to be officially adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council. Finally, with respect to the other proposals, 
including the “Electricity” Directive and the “Electricity” Regulation, negotiations 
are still ongoing.  
 
3.3. THE “CLEAN ENERGY FOR ALL EUROPEANS” AND THE ECO-SOCIAL-
GROWTH TRILEMMA 
   
The “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package is evidently an energy-related 
provision.  As stated, it was conceived in the framework of  the Energy Union initia-
tive by the European Commission, “with the goal of  providing the stable legisla-
tive framework needed to facilitate the clean energy transition” (European Com-
mission website a). The policy proposals were drafted solely by the Directorate 
General for Energy of  the European Commission (European Commission 2016 
b), then deferred to the Industry, Research and Energy Committee of  the European 
Parliament and finally presented as a whole at the Energy Council meeting in De-
 
42 The box enlists the eight pieces of legislation contained in the “Clean energy for All Eu-
ropeans” package with their abbreviations, for the full denominations see the ‘References’ sec-
tion. 
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cember 2016 (Council of  the European Union 2017 b). The compartmentalization 
of  the legislative process is not only indicative of  the way the EU works, but also 
of  the policy area that the package was exclusively subsumed into. 
Nonetheless, the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” legislative package was con-
ceived a cross-sectoral proposal. This is evident by looking at the three goals of  
the package itself  and at the manifested intentions of  the European Commission. 
The package was designed to not only benefit the energy market in the European 
Union, but also to spill positive effects over the economy as a whole, as well as 
over the environment and the social sphere. By “encouraging cross-border coop-
eration and mobilizing public and private investment in the clean energy sector (it 
is estimated that EUR 379 billion will be required each year from 2021 onwards) 
these proposals have the potential to be good for the economy, generating an es-
timated 900.000 jobs and an increase of  up to 1% in GDP over the next decade” 
(European Commission website a). Additionally, the package indeed promotes an 
energy transition that shall be clean, i.e. “embracing renewables and other new and 
innovative technologies” (European Commission website a), as well as just, mean-
ing good for every consumer, especially vulnerable ones (European Commission 
website a).  
In line with the approach the EU has followed through coordinated strategies 
since the 2000s, the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package seems to address 
the eco-social-growth trilemma in a sustainable way, i.e. by looking at the envi-
ronmental, social and economic implications of  its energy strategy and by pre-
scribing the simultaneous maximization of  performance goals in the three spheres. 
EU legislators have been ambitious enough to include social and environmental 
concerns in their energy strategy. However, one could argue that energy is an in-
herently crosscutting political issue. Energy is a suitable topic to highlight the 
many interfaces between the physical, or natural, realm43 and those social systems 
that were created by humans44 (Guruswamy 2011). Therefore, an efficient strategy 
for energy should - almost inevitably - take into account the multi-dimensionality 
of  the phenomenon and its ecologic and social implications and impacts.  
Not only is the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package attempting to deliver 
on such a sustainable approach by supplementing its energy measures with provi-
sions that directly relate to the environmental sphere - like those promoting the 
use of  renewable energies - and the social sphere - like those regarding energy 
communities and consumers’ rights - but it also attempts to address cross-cutting 
political issues, such as energy poverty. Thus, on the one hand, the package aims to 
reconcile social and environmental goals by making its energy strategy just and 
 
43 The forms of energy used in consumption and production processes have several conse-
quences on the degree of degradation of the environment, since they might heavily impact 
both pollution and natural resources depletion, which are the two main factors contributing to 
environmental degradation. 
44 The development of new and modern forms of energy has historically permitted social 
and economic development. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the redistribution of energy resources 
among societal members has significant consequences not only on the structures of societies 
themselves, but also on their cultural background (Guruswamy 2011). 
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sustainable, at least on paper. On the other hand, by tackling energy poverty, which 
is a political challenge that inherently lies between the concerns of  the social and 
the environmental spheres, the package concretely attempts to integrate the two 
dimensions.   
 
3.4. ENERGY POVERTY AND THE PACKAGE 
   
The primary competence for dealing with energy poverty in the European Union 
is held by Member States, since the matter, although highly inter-sectoral, techni-
cally falls into the realm of  social policies which remain a national prerogative 
(EPC 2017). National and local authorities have been left free to address the issue 
with either short-term or long-term solutions45, but there is a high heterogeneity in 
the way European Countries have dealt - or not dealt - with it. 
Perhaps pushed by the need to stimulate convergence among Member States, the 
European Union has developed its interest for vulnerable energy consumers in re-
cent years. Acting under the umbrella of  its competence over the internal market 
for gas and electricity - a responsibility that it shares with Member States - the EU 
has recently adopted few initiatives. These initiatives address, among others, the 
issue of  energy poverty, but they do not contain strong binding obligations for 
Member States to act. Until 2018, the EU legislative framework on energy poverty 
was composed of  two directives adopted in 2009, one concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and natural gas supply and the other concern-
ing common rules for the internal market in natural gas46 (Bouzarovski, Petrova 
and Sarlamanov 2012). These directives were accompanied by an opinion on “En-
ergy poverty in the context of  liberalization and the economic crisis”, issued by 
the European Economic and Social Committee in 2010 (EESC 2010) and by a re-
port issued by the European Commission in 2010. 
 
The slow advancement of  energy poverty policies in the European Union could 
be seen as a reflection of  a lack of  consensus among Member States in developing 
common definitions and indicators, which has resulted in a lack of  commitment to 
act together through the Union (EPC 2017). Additionally, existing EU-wide fund-
 
45 Short-term measures against energy poverty include bans of disconnections; debt protec-
tion measures; and, most commonly, financial interventions, such as tariffs, social supports or 
direct payments, which are aimed at providing relief to energy poor people. Long-term inter-
ventions, on the other hand, include energy efficiency investments; the promotion and invest-
ment in renewable sources of energy; and measures to improve information and awareness 
(EPC 2017). 
46 It was the European Parliament, amending the Commission’s initial proposal, to inte-
grate energy poverty concerns in the texts of two Directives adopted in 2009. These pieces of 
legislation recognized energy poverty as a growing concern in the EU, they urged negligent 
Member States to guarantee due energy supply to vulnerable consumers and to issue periodic 
reports on the state of play of energy poverty in their Country. The directives also recom-
mended Member States to adopt an integrated approach for measuring fuel poverty, thus tak-
ing into account simultaneously social and energy efficiency concerns (Bouzarovski, Petrova 
and Sarlamanov 2012). 
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ing initiatives are considered unfit to alleviate energy poverty and the increasingly 
stringent supra-national constraints on national finances have hindered the capaci-
ty of  national authorities to act in this policy area (EPC 2017), leaving space for 
greater cross-country divergence and lack of  compliance.  
 
The “Clean Energy for All Europeans” represents the most prominent recent leg-
islative initiative aiming to change the energy framework of  the European Union, 
including a strategy for the alleviation of  energy poverty. Several pieces of  legisla-
tion within package may be considered relevant for the issue of  energy poverty.  
 
Energy Poverty is defined within Recital47 40 of  the proposal for the Electricity 
Directive - in a non-binding way - as the inability “to afford basic energy services, 
such as adequate warmth, cooling, lighting and the energy to power appliances, 
due to a combination of  low income, high energy expenditure and poor energy 
efficiency of  their homes" (European Commission 2016 e). Article 29 of  the pro-
posal for the Electricity Directive requires Member States that recognize the exist-
ence of  energy poverty in their Country to define a set of  criteria for measuring it, 
to monitor it and, finally, to report on the evolution of  energy poverty and of  
those measures taken to prevent it to the European Commission every two years, 
as part of  their “Integrated National Energy and Climate Progress Reports” (Eu-
ropean Commission 2016 e; Dunin-Majewska 2017). Article 10 of  the same pro-
posal requires Member States to ensure that customers are given due information 
on alternatives to disconnection sufficiently in advance (European Commission 
2016 e). The European Parliament has put forward amendments to the initial EU 
Commission’s proposal for the Electricity Directive that are more ambitious than 
the proposal itself  when it comes to energy poverty. In particular, it proposed to 
add ‘Article 3 a)’ designed for the European Commission to assist Member States 
with due and targeted measures to enable a clean and just transition and it has 
proposed amendments to Article 29 (Zeitoun 2018). However, these amendments 
are yet to be approved in inter-institutional negotiations. 
By contrast, the Directive on the “energy performance of  buildings” has officially 
been adopted at the moment of  writing the present research. Member States shall 
now submit to the EU an overview of  their long-term renovation strategies and, 
within such strategies, EU Countries shall also outline the most relevant national 
actions taken to alleviate energy poverty (European Parliament and Council of  the 
European Union 2018; European Commission 2016 c). Therefore, through the 
EPBD, long-term building renovation is recognized as a fundamental tool for the 
eradication of  fuel poverty in the EU (Dunin-Majewska 2017). 
The proposal on "energy efficiency” sets an obligation scheme for Member States 
by asking for a share of  energy efficiency measures to be implemented as a priori-
ty in energy poor households and social housing. Alternatively, the Directive urges 
 
47 Unlike articles, Recitals are introductory clauses that cannot count as binding provisions. 
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Member States to take into account the effects of  energy poverty on households48 
(European Commission 2016 a). 
Complementing the other initiatives in the package, the “Proposal for a Regulation 
on the Energy Union” sets an integrated reporting system, which shall be to the 
benefit of  households in energy poverty and shall include both data on the num-
ber of  households in energy poverty and national objectives for the alleviation of  
energy poverty in case that number is high. It also includes deadlines, policies and 
measures to achieve these objectives, which have never been part of  EU legislation 
before. The same Regulation, in line with point ‘(a)’ of  Article 7 of  the “energy 
efficiency” proposal, also requires specific actions, as well as policy measures, to 
increase savings for households affected by energy poverty and for social hous-
ing49 (European Commission 2016 f; Dunin-Majewska 2017). 
Finally, the European Parliament has managed to add several clauses regarding the 
protection of  low-income and vulnerable households50 to the European Commis-
sion’s proposal for the “the promotion of  the use of  energy from renewable 
sources” and agreement has been reached with the EU Council on such amend-
ments (Zeitoun 2018). However, currently, the final text of  the RED still has to be 
adopted. 
The European Commission also set up an EU Energy Poverty Observatory51, which 
was officially launched in January 2018. The objectives of  this project include im-
proving transparency, developing informative resource, enabling networking, dis-
seminating information and providing technical assistance regarding energy pov-
erty in the European Union (Bouzarovski 2017). 
 
Energy Poverty is explicitly recognized as an issue within the “Winter Package”, 
which sets a new framework to protect energy poor households, by making Mem-
 
48 In October 2018, the EED has not been adopted yet. However, the two EU co-
legislators have already reached an agreement, amending the initial proposal, by explicitly refer-
ring to the alleviation of energy poverty as an objective for national measures on energy sav-
ings and by requiring Member States to refer to such measures in their national energy and 
climate reports (Zeitoun 2018). 
49 In October 2018, the “Proposal for a Regulation on the Energy Union” has not been 
adopted yet. However, inter-institutional negotiations have already resulted in an agreement 
(European Commission website a). 
50 In October 2018, the EU Parliament and Council reached an agreement amending the 
RED initial proposal. If such an agreement will be translated in an actual legislative outcome 
(as it probably will), EU Member States will have to make sure that low-income households 
and vulnerable consumers are given access to renewable energy communities and renewable 
self-consumption, by providing them with due information and support measures (Zeitoun 
2018). 
51 The Energy Poverty Observatory “has been developed by a consortium of 13 organisations, 
including universities, think tanks, and the business sector organizations” (EU Energy Poverty 
Observatory website). Six organizations are key partners, whereas the other seven are support-
ing organizations and the University of Manchester leads the consortium. The Observatory is al-
so composed by several other organizations, academics and institutions, all of which serve as 
advisors. The Observatory was awarded a contract by the European Commission. 
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ber States responsible to identify, empower, better inform and protect them (Eu-
ropean Commission 2016 b). States are indeed encouraged to prioritize energy 
poor households in their national strategies for building renovations, for boosting 
energy efficiency and for renewable-energy transition. Through the package, the 
EU also shows its willingness to help Member Countries reducing energy costs for 
vulnerable customers, by enhancing energy efficiency investments (European 
Commission 2016 b). Despite being a massive progress relatively to previous EU-
wide legislation, when it comes to alleviating energy poverty no common defini-
tion was agreed and there is no target, nor binding obligation for Member States 
to comply with. Member States are urged, yet left free, to monitor, report on and 
address the situation of  energy poverty among their citizens. Despite the package 
is made up of  binding pieces of  legislation, if  they lack political willingness, Mem-
ber States might still decide to do nothing at all to combat fuel poverty. This is 
probably a reflection of  the fact that the issue is still perceived primarily as a social 
issue and, thus, European Countries are reluctant to allow the EU to legislate on 
such matter. 
 
3.5. ENERGY POVERTY IN THE EU 
    
Despite the growing salience of  the issue at the EU level, there still is no consen-
sual communitarian definition of  energy poverty. In Europe, there has been sub-
stantial research on energy poverty as well as increasing awareness on the im-
portance of  the phenomenon (Dubois 2017). Moreover, Member States like 
France, Belgium, Ireland, Slovakia and The United Kingdom have already adopted 
national definitions (Dubois 2017).  
 The existing approaches in the literature refer to energy poverty as a level of  en-
ergy consumption that is not sufficient for customers to meet their basic social 
and material needs (González-Eguino 2015; Okushima 2017), or to live a decent 
and healthy life (Okushima 2017). Sources of  confusion in defining energy pov-
erty derive from preliminary definitions of: which energy service shall be consid-
ered fundamental to satisfy one’s social and material needs, or one’s wellbeing and 
health52; what poverty is53; what the basic social and material needs are, or what 
 
52 Energy services like adequate warmth, cooling, lighting or the energy to power appliances 
(EPC 2017) are usually indicated as those basic facilities that a customer should be able to ac-
cess in order not to be considered energy-poor. The United Nation Development Programme 
(UNDP) for instance, considers two energy indicators when it describes the non-income di-
mensions of poverty: electricity and cooking fuels (Sovacool 2012). 
53 The UNDP adopts a multidimensional and dynamic notion of poverty, not accounting 
only for income, but also for factors such as life expectancy, housing, and education. However, 
it expresses multi-dimensional poverty in an absolute way, by setting a universal monetary (in-
come) threshold, currently at 1.25 US Dollar a day (UNDP website), under which people are 
considered to be poor (Sovacool 2012). This is a rather absolute conception of poverty and, as 
such, it might fail to include portions of the population of some Countries that should proba-
bly be considered poor. That is why the European Union has adopted a rather relative concept 
of income poverty. The rate of people at risk of poverty in a population, for the EU standards, 
is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfers) below a cer-
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standards of  wellbeing and health shall be met. A good definition of  energy pov-
erty is hence one that takes into account the multidimensionality of  the issue itself.  
The present study adopts the following definition of  energy poverty: “the absence 
of  sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, high-quality, safe 
and environmentally benign energy services to support economic and human de-
velopment” (Reddy 2000, 44). This definition has several advantages (González-
Eguino 2014). It refers to energy services and not to energy sources or vectors54, 
hence trying to target individuals’ energy demand. Moreover, by referring to a lack 
of  capability or choice, it endorses a concept of  development that goes beyond 
monetary needs and income. It also identifies desirable features of  the technolo-
gies used to provide energy services. They should be adequate - i.e. suited to the 
geographic characteristics – affordable - i.e. cheap in comparison to available al-
ternatives – reliable - i.e. not subject to continuous breaks – safe - i.e. not endan-
gering human health - high-quality - i.e. efficient and versatile - and environmental-
ly benign - i.e. not threatening the environment for present and future generations.  
 
The difficulties in finding a consensual definition of  energy poverty are mirrored 
by even greater disagreement in measuring its incidence55 (Bouzarovski 2014). 
Quantitative estimates for energy poverty rest on arbitrary assumptions regarding 
which energy devices to take into consideration and what basic needs or levels of  
wellbeing are to be met (Nussbaumer, Bazilian and Modi 2012). Traditionally, 
there are three alternative, yet complementary, ways to measure energy poverty 
(González-Eguino 2014). It could be measured through: a technological threshold, 
indicating the portion of  the population with no access to certain energy sources 
that are deemed as basic ones - usually electricity and cooking fuels; a physical 
threshold, estimating the level of  energy consumption under which people cannot 
satisfy their basic necessities; through an economic threshold, establishing the 
maximum share of  income to be destined to energy spending56. Other possibili-
ties, besides the three traditional approaches mentioned above, would be to ex-
 
tain threshold, that is set at the 60% of a certain population median (Eurostat Statistics Ex-
plained website). Deciding how to set the poverty threshold, which factors to take into account 
as determinants of poverty and whether to adopt a relative or an absolute take on poverty are 
relevant choices that have even more relevant political implications. 
54 For a definition of energy poverty not to be biased by different geographic characteris-
tics, i.e. for it to be universal, it is important to stress on both the access and the affordability 
of energy services (Okushima 2017) In this way, it would be possible to to give centrality to the 
human need for energy services, which can be considered similar around the world, whereas 
energy sources and vectors  vary considerably from one household to another (González-
Eguino 2014). 
55 The task of measuring energy poverty has been proven challenging, perhaps due to the 
peculiar nature of the phenomenon itself, which is a private challenge for households that sig-
nificantly varies through time and space and it is sensitive to cultural differences and social ex-
pectations (Bouzarovski 2014). 
56 Measuring energy poverty through a physical threshold mirrors adopting an absolute ap-
proach to poverty, whereas using an economic threshold for measurement is in line with a rela-
tive approach to poverty (see footnote 56).  
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plore subjective perceptions of  households about their energy consumption pat-
terns (Bouzarovski 2014), to measure inconveniences, such as health impacts, and 
to measure energy deprivation57(Pachauri and Spreng 2011). Efforts to provide 
consistent indexes and/or indicators at a global level are generally lacking and they 
include those developed by the United Nation Development Programme 
(UNDP)58 and the World Health Organization59, which account for access to 
modern fuels and electricity (Pachauri and Spreng 2011). Perhaps the most rele-
vant mainstream international indicator is the Energy Development Index60 created by 
the International Energy Agency61 in 2004.  
Without a common EU-wide indicator, it is hard to estimate the proper scale of  
the energy poverty problem. Some studies estimate that between 50 and 125 mil-
lion people are at risk of  energy poverty in the European Union (EPEE 2009). 
More specifically, “9.4% of  the EU population was unable to keep their home ad-
equately warm in 2015; 9.1% accumulated arrears on their electricity bills and 
15.2% lived in home with a leaking roof, damp walls, porous windows frames or 
floors” (EPC 2017, 1). Furthermore, the European Commission has recognized 
that the share of  domestic spending dedicated to energy services has grown from 
6% in 2000 to 9% in 2014 among the lowest quantile of  the income distribution 
of  the population, whereas it has only increased by 1% for the entire population 
(EPC 2017). This data clearly demonstrates the existence of  a link between eco-
nomic inequalities and the affordability of  energy services for domestic house-
holds. Furthermore, certain segments of  the population are more at risk to fall in-
to energy poverty than others, particularly retired or elderly people, disable people, 
single parent families, precarious workers and people whose income largely de-
pend on social security benefits (EPEE 2009). 
 
Most studies assessing the root causes of  energy poverty have identified a three 
main determinants, working in combination (EPEE 2009, Jones 2016). The first 
driver of  energy poverty is poverty itself, combined with declining household in-
 
57 Deprivation is defined as the deviation between actual energy access and an estimated 
minimum threshold (Pachauri and Spreng 2011). 
58 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is an international organization 
established in 1996 by United Nation General Assembly working on development projects and 
programmes. 
59 The World Health Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations concerned 
with international public health. The Organization is very active in providing data and recom-
mendations regarding the effects of energy services on human health. 
60 The Energy Development Index is actually a measure of the transition of energy systems 
towards modern fuels. Studies shows that there is a negative relation between this index and 
energy poverty (Nussbaumer, Bazilian and Modi 2012). It is a composite indicator that allows 
for cross-Country, but not cross-time analysis (Pachauri and Spreng 2011). It combines three 
equally-weighted indicators: per capita commercial energy consumption, share of commercial 
energy in total final energy use, and share of the population that has access to electricity. 
61 The International Energy Agency is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1974 
in the framework of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development and it 
holds advisory powers. 
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come62. The underlying assumption is that low-income households have a lower 
amount of  disposable funds to spend on energy services (Bouzarovski 2014), 
which usually constitute a large share of  households’ consumption patterns. A 
second major cause of  energy poverty is the increase of  energy prices in the mar-
ket63. High prices reduce the affordability of  energy sources and vectors, making 
low-income households less able to provide themselves with the needed energy 
services (Jones 2016). Finally, the quality of  thermal efficiency and housing could 
be considered as the third main source of  energy poverty in Europe. “Residents 
of  inefficient dwellings are forced to purchase less affordable energy services than 
the rest of  the population because such homes are more expensive to heat” (Bou-
zarovski 2014, 279). Therefore, the configuration of  the housing64 stock and the 
lack of  accessibility of  housing make energy services less affordable for low-
income households65 (Jones 2016). These three causes overlap and interact with 
one another and with the specific energy needs of  households which vary largely 
according to factors such as demographic circumstances, household composition, 
occupation and gender (Bouzarovski 2014).  
 
With respect to the consequences of  energy poverty, perhaps the first effect is de-
terioration of  health. Negative health effects caused by long and continuous expo-
sure to indoor pollution generated by unclean energy sources, such as biomasses, 
make the population more vulnerable to very dangerous cardiovascular and respir-
atory diseases (González-Eguino 2014). Health effects of  even lighter kind prove 
to be more severe for the most vulnerable sections of  the population (Jones 2016). 
Winter mortality has been proven not to be related to climate conditions, but ra-
ther to the quality of  housing and energy systems (Jones 2016). Furthermore, liv-
ing in fuel poor households is related to mental health problems, anxiety and risk 
of  social exclusion and isolation (EPEE 2009; Jones 2016).  
A second notable consequence of  energy poverty is on the economic and social 
spheres.  The lack of  energy services - and subsequent health problems - could 
potentially provoke negative downturns on education levels and employment per-
formances, often inducing public authorities to increase social spending to over-
 
62 While some studies identify income poverty as the main driving force behind increasing 
fuel poverty levels in Europe (EPEE 2009; Jones 2016); others have concentrated upon the 
weight of energy-related expenses in consumption patterns, finding out that energy costs are 
the highest expenses after food for many low-income households (Jones 2016). It has to be 
specified although, that not all low-income households are necessarily energy poor and vice-
versa (Bouzarovski 2014). This makes the case for energy poverty to be a special form of pov-
erty, related to, but not subsumed by, general poverty. 
63 Gas prices have increased by an average of 18% between 2005 and 2007 (EPEE 2009) 
and electricity prices have increased by an average of 14% in the same span of time (EPEE 
2009). 
64 Countries with poor housing have been associated in empirical studies to high rates of 
winter mortality (Bouzarovski 2014). 
65 Upgrading insulation in poor housing could prove to be too costly or ineffective for en-
ergy poor customers (Jones 2016), causing them to be stuck with expensive infrastructures and 
energy providers. 
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come and prevent these problems that could otherwise harm the entire perfor-
mance of  an economy (González-Eguino 2014; Jones 2016). Moreover, energy 
poor households are often faced with the difficult choice between cutting energy 
consumption or increasing indebtedness to avoid disconnections and evictions 
(Jones 2016). Energy poverty is not relevant merely from the consumption side of  
the economy: investments in efficient energy sources and infrastructures could in-
deed positively affect some production sectors, boosting general economic devel-
opment (González-Eguino 2014).  
Finally, energy poverty has a considerable impact on the environment, mostly 
linked to climate change66, deforestation67 and land degradation68. The excessive 
use of  biofuels, which are the most widespread sources of  energy for low-income 
people around the world, is in fact one of  the main causes of  deforestation, deser-
tification and land degradation (González-Eguino 2014). These phenomena have 
further detrimental consequences for agricultural production, food security, land 
fertility, ecosystem stability and pollution (González-Eguino 2014; Sovacool 2012). 
In more industrialized countries, greenhouse gas emissions69 are predominantly 
caused by electricity generation and transportation, whereas in developing coun-
tries, the main responsible for such polluting emissions are the agricultural sector 
and changes in land use (Casillas and Kammen 2010). Therefore, environmental 
degradation is predominantly caused by production processes and big-size compa-
nies. Consumers, especially vulnerable ones, are arguably less responsible for eco-
logical shocks. However, such shocks have a greater impact on the most vulnerable 
subsets of  the population, since they are less equipped to cope with the negative 
costs of  environmental degradation (Casillas and Kammen 2010, Gough 2013). 
Thus, some authors have referred to the situation as a “double injustice” (Koch 
and Fritz 2014 a).  
As evident, the causes and consequences of  energy poverty are matters of  con-
cern for political actors that represent both environmental and social interests. 
These concerns - and the political demands that raise from them - cannot be treat-
ed in isolation, given the many interdependencies and implications that exist 
among them. Therefore, energy poverty could be defined as a multifaceted politi-
cal challenge, simultaneously raising claims for the optimization of  social and envi-
ronmental performance goals. 
 
66 The energy production chain is one of the key drivers of the exacerbation of climate 
change, which is worsened by reduced CO2 absorption capacity (González-Eguino 2014).  
67 The loss of woodland prevents the poor to access the only energy source that they con-
sider affordable, despite being environmentally harmful: wood itself (González-Eguino 2014). 
68 Vulnerable subsets of the population are not only directly affected by the decrease in the 
availability of woodland (see previous footnote), but also indirectly, through the reduction in 
many services that used to be supplied by now endangered ecosystems, such as water and food 
(González-Eguino 2014). 
69  A greenhouse gas has the property to absorb and emit radiant energy and it serves to 
keep the average temperature of the Earth’s surface at levels acceptable for biological life. Hu-
man activities in the last few decades have increased the level of emission of greenhouse gases, 
thus giving rise to an extremely dangerous phenomenon called climate change. 
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4. LOBBYING AT THE EU LEVEL 
 
Lobbies are organizational forms that catalyze sector-specific interests and formu-
late policy demands. In light of  their prominent role in the political sphere, lobbies 
are the subjects of  the present research and, in particular, the focus is placed on 
European network-based and advocacy-oriented NGOs and trade unions. 
The term lobbying is often used as a synonym for advocacy. However, if  advocacy 
is understood as an attempt to induce policy change and, thus, exerting influence 
represents the main objective of  advocacy-oriented organizations, lobbying is per-
haps the most common advocacy strategy, alongside campaigning (Yanacopulos 
2005). Lobbying and campaigning70 imply different aims, techniques and tactics. 
Lobbying is a much more targeted strategy, requiring a remarkable ability to nego-
tiate with, as well as to persuade and provide needed information to key political 
actors (Yanacopulos 2005). The typical tools of  a lobbying strategy are finding 
facts, conducting policy analyses and developing a solid network of  key political 
contacts to target (Oanta and Vasilcovschi 2014). Even though the meaning of  the 
term may seem straightforward71, different definitions of  lobbying exist in the lit-
erature of  interest representation (Oanta and Vasilcovschi 2014). The present re-
search adopts the following definition: “lobbying procedure is to influence or at-
tempt to influence72 legislative administrative decisions by public authorities 
through representatives interested73. Influence is intentional, involves the use of  
communication and is directed by legislative or executive structures” (Koeppl 
2001, 71). 
A successful lobbying strategy is based on four pillars: “the ability to create clear 
objectives and goals”; “the ability to develop connections”; “the access to strategic 
 
70 Campaigning aims at influencing the public opinion with the purpose to mobilize enough 
support to put pressure on policymakers (Yanacopulos 2005). Campaigns are typically adver-
sarial, i.e. they work best when there is a fault or an injustice to be fought. They employ a large 
variety of tools, including the media, slogans and street parades. They also may have other ob-
jective besides exerting influence, like publicity or fund raising. 
71 From an etymological point of view, the term ‘lobby’ derives from the old Germanic 
word ‘louba’, which means hall or roof (Marusca and Irimies 2013). One of the most notable 
times the term was first used as a verb could be traced back to a quote by United States’ Presi-
dent Ulysses S. Grant, who was in office from 1869 to 1877. The President, forced to live in a 
hotel for a short period of time after the White House was destroyed by a fire, once com-
plained about people waiting for him in the hotel lobby seemingly willing to influence his deci-
sions (Oanta and Vasilcovschi 2014). Since in the past politicians used not to have private of-
fices, hallways often became places for discussing matters of political interest (Oanta and Va-
silcovschi 2014). 
72 It should be specified that some authors have argued that lobbying consists more in 
providing an informational service to allied institutional actors, who are usually too under-
staffed to do it themselves, than in influencing hostile decision-makers, which could prove to 
be too costly or unsuccessful (Chalmers 2011). 
73 Representativeness refers to creating a direct contact between the different factors that 
affect decision in the name of a certain interest (Soimu, Margarit, Andrisan and Stefan 2011). 
Lobbying is hence the exercise of delegating to certain agents the task to support and put for-
ward specific rights, interests or opinions (Oanta and Vasilcovschi 2014). 
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information”; “the analyses of  different politics and the ability to promote them in 
public” (Oanta and Vasilcovschi 2014, 180). 
  
The exact number of  lobbies - or interest groups - active at the European level is 
uncertain and different estimates provide different figures on the scale of  the phe-
nomenon. 5.039 interest groups are accredited within the European Parliament, 
70% of  them being business-oriented and 30% being non-business organizations 
(Coen and Richardson 2009). The predominance of  business interest groups over 
civil society organizations and trade unions (Greenwood 2007) is a reflection of  
the fact that access to EU institutions is determined by resource endowment, 
which is greater for business organizations (Dür and Mateo 2012). Despite the 
prevalence of  business organizations, civil society has gained popularity in recent 
years and EU institutions themselves74 have developed a discourse in favor of  en-
hancing social dialogue, mainly with a view to build support for EU initiatives and 
to contrast EU’s increasing lack of  legitimacy (Smismans 2003; Pasquino 2012). 
This research is particularly focused on NGOs and trade unions acting as advoca-
cy organizations at the European level. 
Europeanization refers to the process of  adaptation of  political actors to Europe-
an integration (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). For interest groups, it refers to the 
strategic evaluation - and choice - of  shifting activities and loyalties to the Europe-
an level, as a consequence of  the acknowledged impact of  the EU on their politi-
cal interests (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). Europeanization may mean that na-
tional interest groups decide to work themselves at the European level, or that 
they decide to set up cross-national networks that would do so. Typically, the fac-
tors that determine the decision for lobbies to Europeanize are: resources75, em-
beddedness in their immediate environment76, the perceived importance of  the 
supra-national level, the width of  their membership - and hence their degree of  
representativeness - and the degree of  formalization of  their network (Scar-
amuzzino and Wennerhag 2015; Coen and Richardson 2009; Beyers and Kerre-
mans 2007; Binderkrantz and Rasmussen 2015).  
 
The strategic actions that advocacy networks decide to pursue are determined 
primarily by the phase of  the EU policy-making process77 that they aim at target-
 
74 The discursive – and concrete - attempts to engage civil society organizations and trade 
unions in policymaking have been pursued mostly by the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) and by the European Commission, primarily for institutional interests 
(Smismans 2003). 
75 Resources-rich organizations engage more with lobbying at the European level. Howev-
er, the perception of budget competition and critical resource dependencies are more relevant 
than resources per se (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). 
76 If interest groups are tied to policy domains over which State sovereignty dominates EU 
competence, they will likely prefer engaging at the national level. 
77 The European Commission is in charge of legislative initiative. Co-decision is the ordi-
nary legislative procedure. This means that neither the European Parliament nor the Council 
may adopt any pieces of legislation without the other’s assent (Daniele 2014). 
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ing. Basically, lobbies have five different opportunities for influencing institutional 
decision-making (Long and Lörinczi 2009). They could intervene on an early 
stage, pushing institutions to insert non-salient issues in their political agenda. 
They could engage with the consultation processes for new policy proposals, usu-
ally set up by the European Commission, or with the proper legislative activities 
of  the European Parliament and the Council, intervening by providing inputs to 
readings, to plenary or committees’ positions or to the conciliation phase. After 
the adoption of  a piece of  legislation, advocacy can consist in putting forward 
recommendations for the appropriate implementation of  such provision, or in 
contributing to monitoring implementation and enforcement.  
NGOs are regarded to be more successful in accessing the European Parliament 
than business organizations. However, the European Commission remains the eas-
iest target for any kind of  interest group (Long and Lörinczi 2009). When it comes 
to accessing and influencing decision-making, many differences exist between the 
various EU institutions with respect to how interest groups are involved. Choosing 
which institutional channel is more convenient for a lobby to target depends on a 
series of  circumstances, including the nature of  the interest group,  its resources, 
the policy area it wishes to target, the legislative procedure and the position of  all 
the various institutions on the issue it wishes to influence (Nugent 2011). 
 
4.1. EUROPEAN LOBBIES CROSS-SECTORAL MOBILIZATION 
 
Many similarities exist between interest groups operating in the same issue area: 
they rely on similar financial resources, they tend to be ideologically similar and 
they work within similar institutional contexts (Geyer 2001). These organizations 
are often aware of  one another and they sometimes even establish alliances to-
gether (Geyer 2001). As consequence, the differences between interest groups 
working on separate policy areas are usually stronger than those existing within a 
single sphere. This is also valid for pressure groups working in the social and the 
environmental spheres at the EU level. For this and other reasons, cross-sectoral 
mobilization for European lobbies is relatively rare. Here below the paper reflects 
on the potential for European interest groups to either create coalitions or con-
flict. 
 
4.1.1. COALITION BUILDING 
 
Coalitions could be seen as advocacy strategies commonly used by pressure groups 
to associate with other political actors in order to exert political influence. Given a 
general confusion in defying what a coalition is, some studies (Pijnenburg 1998) 
have attempted to distinguish inter-organizational collaborative efforts according 
to two dimensions: the durability of  the relationships within the coalition, which is 
reflected in the degree of  formalization of  the alliance itself, and the degree of  in-
dividual autonomy that each organization retains within the group. Unification 
happens when autonomy is low and when the collaboration is highly formalized. 
At the two opposite sides of  this two-dimensional space, there are interdepend-
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ence and coordination78, i.e. settings where the degree of  autonomy and formali-
zation are respectively both low and both high. Cooperation is instead an ad-hoc 
form of  inter-organizational integration. Ad-hoc coalitions are single-issue the-
matic alliances, whose mandate is supposed to expire the moment joint work is no 
more needed or when its members consider it appropriate (Pijnenburg 1998). 
Therefore, ad-hoc alliances are characterized by little to no formalization, a limited 
duration and a high degree of  autonomy of  its members.  
The only necessary requisite for inter-organizational alliances to be considered co-
alitions is a high degree of  autonomy of  its members79. In fact, coalitions may 
bring together like-minded organizations, but also actors that do not share the 
same views on everything (Ritchie 1995).  
Only through durable and formalized structures, organizations can achieve full 
coordination. However, ad-hoc informal alliances could be more convenient for 
organizations when they decide to work together. In ad-hoc coordination, com-
munication, decision-making and structures are flexible and adaptable to the 
changes that are likely to occur frequently in a political context (Pijnenburg 1998). 
Moreover, focusing on a single issues makes agreement on common policy de-
mands and strategies easier for coalition members and it makes their contributions 
seem more valuable and indispensable (Pijnenburg 1998). Needless to say, ad-hoc 
coalitions also have several disadvantages, including a general instability, difficulties 
in carrying on the shared work and sometimes incoherence of  the coalition’s 
agenda with its partners’ own priorities (Pijnenburg 1998). However, in general, 
“maintaining a coalition is surely more often a matter of  shared vision and solidar-
ity than a shared rulebook” (Ritchie 1995, 524). 
There are several reasons why pressure groups might decide to join forces with 
other organizations of  the same nature. Coalition-building might be seen either as 
the best strategy to overcome the scarcity of  resources80 that lobbies usually face 
(Yanacopulos 2005), or as the best strategy to address salient political issues81 
(Junk 2016). Whatever the approach, coalition-building is always a strategic choice 
for interest groups, in the effort to pursue their own priorities. Lobbies might con-
sider forming coalitions because they see it as an effective way to increase the im-
pact - or the legitimacy - of  their advocacy activities. Policy impact is strengthened 
by alliances either because individual organizations have the opportunity to share 
resources and, thus, to save economic costs and staff  capacity, or because alliances 
 
78 Umbrella organizations (i.e. alliances of organizations, which delegate considerable re-
sponsibilities to a supra-organizational level, which, in turn, provides its members with re-
sources and with a common identity) might be an example of coordination. 
79 In the cases of unification and interdependence, organizations lose their individuality and 
are subsumed in a single structure, which is not what coalitions are supposed to be. 
80 According to the resources-dependency theory, advocacy organizations are strategic-
oriented entities heavily affected by a scarcity of the resources (Yanacopulos 2005). 
81 According to this interpretation, issue-level factors would be the main driving forces for 
public interest organizations, i.e. for those organizations that promote public goods, to act 
(Junk 2016). Therefore, salient issues and/or issues that impact public goods are elements that 
these organizations would consider more important than resources and capacity (Junk 2016). 
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allow members to exploit the economies of  scale arising from coordination82 
(Yanacopulos 2005). Widening the support for an advocacy activity through a coa-
lition allows its various members to increase the legitimacy – and thus the appeal - 
of  the policy demands they all have signed up to (Yanacopulos 2005).  
 
4.1.2. CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? 
 
Despite the above-mentioned benefits that organizations may obtain from joining 
forces, inter-organizational mobilization mostly remains weak and limited (Geyer 
2001). Advocacy networks’ cooperative mobilization is significant and durable only 
around the most basic political issues (Geyer 2001).  
Does this mean that interest groups’ behavior towards alike organizations is con-
flictual? After all, their raison d’être is to promote their own claims in accordance 
with their mandate. This implies that such organizations will cooperate or compete 
depending on circumstances. In many cases, instead of  establishing coalitions, 
lobbies find it more appropriate to pursue their goals on their own, for example 
because an issue is considered particularly salient for an organization and, thus, it 
might not want to compromise its demands with those of  other organizations.  
Conflicts are often favored by the peculiar context in which lobbies operate, par-
ticularly European NGOs. Such organizations are often constrained by their lim-
ited budgets, which cause them to lobby less than what they would consider ap-
propriate (Gullberg 2008). Lobbies, especially NGOs and trade unions, are aware 
of  the fact that institutions can emphasize, promote or even financially support 
their work83 (Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011). Consequently, they have to adjust to 
a non-regulated environment, constructed upon the principle of  free competition 
among different interests (Svendsen 2011). Therefore, in such a framework, strate-
gic conflicts among lobbies can easily arise. Furthermore, organizations may also 
disagree on the merits of  a political issue. This is not surprising considering that 
lobbies’ main concern is their own agenda, regardless of  what others strive for.  
Studies about NGOs’ cooperation in the social sector have found out that pres-
sure groups are often aware of  the benefits of  cooperation and they normally 
want to enhance coordination (Geyer 2001). However, advocacy organization co-
operative impetus is constantly undermined by the complex structure of  the envi-
ronment they work in and by their potentially divergent interests. It follows that 
cooperation is hard to achieve and, thus, it is not frequent and always rather lim-
 
82 The economies of scale arising from coordination refer to the benefits members of an al-
liance have from sharing information and communication skills with other organizations 
(Yanacopulos 2005). By increasing specialization through coalitions, the quality of research and 
evaluation also increases, normally making alliances more informed and more efficient than 
individual organizations (Yanacopulos 2005). 
83 NGOs oftentimes tend to compete for available national or European funds (Mahoney 
and Beckstrand 2011). In the case of the European Commission, for example, organizations 
know that this institution is generally willing to fund non-governmental actors, provided that 
they respond to specific requirements and that they are able to provide the Commission itself 
with the services it seeks from them (Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011). 
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ited (Geyer 2001). 
There are several factors that make coordination difficult to develop and to main-
tain and they are the same that push lobbies to compete with one another. First, 
even when members share similar views, coalitions tend to reflect a hierarchical 
structure that, in turn, is determined by the capacity and the financial resources of  
each coalition member. This could result in capacity imbalances and in biased de-
cision-making within alliances and it could ultimately discourage organizations 
from joining coalitions in the first place (Geyer 2001). Furthermore, establishing 
informal common structures is not necessarily a way to render deliberations easier 
to reach, as the confusion around the rules that regulate decision-making may as 
well create personal struggles and divisions in the groups (Geyer 2001). The fact 
that organizations sometimes compete for funds or resources and that they may 
hold divergent political views could also be mirrored in the dynamics of  a coali-
tion (Geyer 2001). Each pressure group is the depositary of  a complex set of  in-
terests, which mix coherently within the organization itself. However, this com-
plexity could easily hinder full cooperation with other organizations, that are also 
composite themselves (Geyer 2001). While agreeing on some political views, or-
ganizations may strongly disagree on others. It could be difficult for a group of  
different organizations to share a detailed programme on many salient political is-
sues, without compromising their core values. If  they compromise their core val-
ues, interest groups would lose their autonomy, which is a detrimental condition 
for coalitions to be defined as such. 
 
 
 
5. CASE STUDY: THE COALITION ‘RIGHT TO ENERGY FOR ALL 
EUROPEANS’ 
 
5.1. COMPOSITION, HISTORY & POLICY OBJECTIVES 
  
Established in June 2017, the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition is a “coali-
tion of  trade unions, anti-poverty organizations and environmental NGOs” 
(EAPN et al. 2017) that is “committed to join efforts to fight energy poverty and 
defend the right to renewable energy for all” (EAPN et al. 2017). 
At the moment of  writing, the coalition includes sixteen organizations. A com-
plete list of  the co-partners of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition is pro-
vided in the box below. The members enlisted are those reported on the coalition’s 
official website (Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition website) and social media 
accounts (Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition Twitter account). However, as it 
will be discussed in the following sections, the coalition does not have a proper 
formalized setting. As consequence, the composition of  the alliance has varied 
considerably since its original formation84 and several other organizations have 
 
84 The organizations that signed the letter addressed to EU policymakers in June 2017 
could be considered as the original members of the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition. 
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taken part to the coalition’s meetings, despite not being counted as official mem-
bers85, including those national organizations that are part of  the networks of  
some coalition’s members. As illustrated above, the composition of  the coalition is 
heterogeneous, meaning that it encompasses organizations of  different nature, in-
cluding and balancing different interests. If  originally it was meant to only envis-
age trade unions, social and environmental NGOs, now the coalition defines itself  
as a “European coalition, uniting trade unions, anti-poverty organizations, social 
housing providers, environmental organizations and energy cooperatives” (Right to 
Energy for All Europeans coalition website). 
 
  
Box 2 
Members of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition86 
 
• COFACE-FAMILIES Europe 
• Droit à l’énergie SOS Futur 
• Energy Cities 
• Europe Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
• European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) 
• European Climate Foundation (ECF) 
• European Federation of  Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW) 
• European Federation of  National Organisations Working with the Homeless 
(FEANTSA) 
• European Federation of  Renewable Energy Cooperatives (REScoop.eu) 
• European Public Service Union (EPSU) 
• Friends of  the Earth Europe (FoEE) 
• Greenpeace - European Unit 
• Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL) 
• Housing Europe 
• Social Platform 
• The Energy Action Project (ENACT) 
 
 
The box below provides a brief  overview of  the history of  the coalition’s main ac-
tivities since its creation. 
 
These organizations were: EAPN, EPSU, Greenpeace Europe, FoEE, Droit à l’énergie SOS 
Futur, ETUC, Coface-Families Europe; EFBWW, FEANTSA and the Social Platform. 
85 Some of the European organizations that got involved with the activities of the Right to 
Energy for All Europeans coalition at different stages include the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation, 
NEON and the Transnational Institute.  
86 More information about these organizations can be found on their official websites, re-
spectively: www.coface.eu.org; www.energiesosfutur.org; www.energy-cities.eu; www.etuc.org; 
www.eapn.eu; www.europeanclimate.org; www.efbww.org; www.feantsa.org; www.rescoop.eu; 
www.epsu.org; www.foeeurope.org; www.greenpeace.eu; www.env-health.org; 
www.housingeurope.eu; www.socialplatform.org; www.en-act.org. 
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Box 3 
Chronology of  the most relevant activities of  the  
Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition 
 
April 2017: Following the joint publication of  “The Right to Energy for all Euro-
peans!” leaflet (EAPN and EPSU 2017), in a closed meeting, EAPN and EPSU 
launched the initiative of  a coalition gathering European civil society organizations 
and trade unions to work together on the issues of  energy poverty and on the 
right to energy (EAPN 2018). 
8 June 2017: The “kick-off  meeting” of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans Coali-
tion took place in EPSU’s offices. 
21 June 2017: A letter, drafted by FoEE and announcing the formation of  the 
coalition, as well as its political positions, came out (EAPN et al. 2017). The letter 
was subsequently published on several websites of  the signatory parties. Then it 
was sent to Permanent Representatives87 and key Members of  the European Par-
liament (MEPs) within the Industry, Research and Energy and the Environment, Public 
Health, Food Safety committees, in light of  their involvement with the legislative 
processes related to the “Winter Package” (International environmental NGO 
2018). To present the letter, members of  the coalition has also organized private 
meetings with MEPs, such as Miriam Dalli from the S&D political group. 
1 September 2017: The coalition created its own Twitter account. Through social 
media, the coalition is able to forward its policy position, publications and events 
and to spread information about energy poverty in the EU (FoEE 2018 b). 
7 September 2017: The coalition published its first op-ed on the Euractive website 
(Euractive 2017) containing its position on energy poverty. 
12 September 2017: The coalition organized a breakfast event in the European 
Parliament, hosted by S&D MEP Theresa Griffin, with the name “How to achieve 
the right to energy for all Europeans?” (EPSU 2017). Members of  the European 
Parliament from the Greens and the United Left political groups also attended the 
meeting. 
October – November 2017: The coalition engaged with political groups within 
the European Parliament to lobby the voting within the Industry, Research and Energy 
committee on the EED and RED - which happened in November - pushing for a 
higher target on energy efficiency and for the prioritization of  energy poor house-
holds in renewable energy strategies. In November, the coalition agreed on a set 
of  seven key demands for policymakers (FoEE 2018 b). 
5 December 2017: The coalition, with the support of  the political groups S&D, 
Greens, EFDD and GUE/NGL, organized another conference entitled “Ensur-
ing the Right to Energy for all Europeans” at the European Parliament in Brussels 
(Coface-families Europe 2017). The event took place one day before the vote 
 
87 Permanent Representatives are heads of the diplomatic missions of EU Member States 
in Brussels and, among other tasks, they are responsible for preparing the agenda for the meet-
ings of the Council of the European Union. 
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within the Industry, Research and Energy committee of  the European Parliament on 
the Governance Regulation and during the trilogies on the EPBD, with the mani-
fested intent to influence both processes. At the event, a series of  recommenda-
tions were put forward for EU policymakers to deal with the issue of  energy pov-
erty. The coalition also presented its policy demands, agreed internally the previ-
ous month. The event was attended by nearly seventy people, included several 
MEPs (EPSU 2018). 
29 January 2018: The coalition engaged in social media activities related to the 
event organized by the European Commission for the launch of  the Energy Pov-
erty Observatory (Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition Twitter account). 
February 2018: In the occasion of  the vote of  the Industry, Research and Energy 
committee of  the European Parliament on the Electricity Directive and Regula-
tion, the coalition organized bilateral meetings with key MEPs, sending them vot-
ing recommendations as well. At the same time, the coalition also did social media 
work on the two initiatives. As a result, the European Parliament strengthened the 
language on energy poverty in the abovementioned pieces of  legislation (FoEE 
2018 b). 
March 2018: The coalition was funded by one its own members, i.e. the European 
Climate Foundation. As a result, the alliance decided to provide resources to 
Clémence Hutin, Climate Justice and Energy Campaigner within Friends of  the 
Earth Europe, to dedicate 50% of  her working hours to work for the Right to En-
ergy for All Europeans coalition. Hutin took over the role of  coordinator of  the coa-
lition’s activity (EPSU 2018). In the same month, the coalition sent a series of  let-
ters to Permanent Representatives, in an attempt to influence trilogues on the en-
tire “Clean Energy for All Europeans” legislative package. 
April 2018: The coalition held an internal strategic meeting, with a view to reflect 
on what they had already done in terms of  activities, achievements and policy im-
pact. In the same meeting, coalition partners also evaluated the strengths and 
weaknesses of  the coalition and established upcoming objectives and activities. 
Thereby coalition partners decided to expand their activities by involving their 
members at the national level and to keep working together even after the end of  
the legislative process related to the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package 
(EPSU 2018; FoEE 2018 b). 
 
The Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition is “committed to join efforts to fight 
energy poverty and defend the right to renewable energy for all” (EAPN et al. 
2017). Hence, the primary idea behind such an alliance was to put together a com-
prehensive group of  interests groups that could effectively tackle the issue of  en-
ergy poverty from different angles and in a cross-sectoral manner (Housing Eu-
rope 2018; International environmental NGO 2018). In fact, “Energy poverty lies 
at the intersection of  different issues: a warming world that puts people and planet 
at risk, increasing social inequality, and an unjust energy system. These multiple 
dimensions of  energy poverty call for a holistic political approach, to jointly tackle 
its causes and consequences” (Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition website). 
Therefore, recognizing the multi-dimensionality of  energy poverty, the coalition 
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developed common cross-sectoral goals and a strategy to effectively address the 
issue. These goals were then translated into more concrete demands for policy-
makers, in order influence the legislative process on the “Clean Energy for All Eu-
ropeans” package (Housing Europe 2018; FoEE 2018 a). However, “the coalition 
was not formed only to influence the package” (Housing Europe 2018) and with 
the expansion of  its mandate, its policy demands will remain valid guidelines for 
future lobbying activities beyond the package. Member organizations, in fact, share 
basic common principles, views and objectives on energy policies, which could po-
tentially bind them together even beyond their current campaign on the package 
and regardless of  its results. 
 
Seven key demands for policymakers were put together in November 2017 and 
presented during the event that the coalition organized on 5 December 2017. Box 
4 below enlists these demands. Additionally, the list identifies in brackets the pieces 
of  legislation in the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” legislative package that 
each demand targets. 
 
Box 4 
The Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition’s key demands  
to eliminate energy poverty 
 
• “Provide a definition of  energy poverty (Governance Regulation); 
• Ban disconnections (Market design files) 
• A binding 40% energy efficiency target to ramp up renovation efforts (EED); 
• Target vulnerable consumers in renovation efforts (EED) 
• Ensure a minimum provision of  energy for all (Market design files) 
• Support community energy initiatives in the fighting against energy poverty 
(RED) 
• Recognize energy as a basic human right” 
 
 
5.2. THE RATIONALE BEHIND JOINING FORCES 
  
There are at least two reasons why the members of  the Right to Energy for All Euro-
peans coalition decided to join their forces with other organizations and work on 
energy poverty together.  
A first justification is related to capacity and resources. Some organizations do not 
have sufficient means to work on energy poverty on their own (EAPN 2018; 
Housing Europe 2018). Despite considering energy poverty as a key area of  inter-
est, capability issues prevented NGOs and trade unions’ staff  members from 
working on it by themselves, since many of  them are struggling to carry out even 
their ordinary activities and to deliver on their mandate (EAPN 2018). Joining a 
coalition could be seen also as a valid opportunity for organizations lacking suffi-
cient economic and human resources to make sure that the work is carried out on 
their behalf. Needless to say, organizations would still have to contribute somehow 
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to the activities of  the coalition if  they want to be sure that their proposals are 
taken on board. Nonetheless, sharing responsibilities makes the individual effort 
much less demanding than it would be if  organizations had worked separately: it 
could be seen as a way for them to minimize their effort and still try to exert polit-
ical influence (Housing Europe 2018).  
Furthermore, joining a coalition could also be a strategic move for organizations 
to impact policymaking in areas that are not their core business. Sometimes, espe-
cially for organizations with less formalized networks, coalition-building is a rather 
top-down choice. This means that members often do not give their secretariat a 
mandate to work on certain political issues, since these topics might be related to, 
but not fundamental for, their interest. However, given that lobbying through coa-
litions is relatively less costly, staff  members may take the opportunity to join an 
alliance when it comes along, even in the absence of  a specific mandate to do so 
(Housing Europe 2018).  
 
“From our perspective, in general, when we decide to join a coalition is because we are not able to 
do the lobbying ourselves and/or because we do not have a mandate to talk about some issues 
from our members” (Housing Europe 2018). 
“Most of  the work on energy poverty is concentrated in the internal electricity market directive, 
which is where we can find the article with the definition of  energy poverty. So, this is a directive 
where we, as an organization, had not a mandate actually from our members. They usually ask 
us to work on energy performance of  buildings, or on energy efficiency, but less on the internal 
energy market for many reasons” (Housing Europe 2018). 
 
The second most relevant reason that justifies the decision to affiliate with the 
Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition - or with coalitions in general - relates to 
political influence. NGOs and trade unions have recognized that that coalition’s 
actions are more impactful than they would be if  carried out individually (EPSU 
2018; EAPN 2018; International environmental NGO 2018). This is due to the 
fact that, unlike many of  its members, the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition 
has the resources and the willingness to work on energy poverty and to impact 
policy outcomes.  
Moreover, the idea of  delegating responsibilities to an alliance is understandably 
attractive for every organization if  the coalition’s work seems to get positive feed-
backs (International environmental NGO 2018; EPSU 2018). The broad, inclusive 
and heterogeneous composition of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition 
has been recognized as added value by policymakers (EAPN 2018; Housing Eu-
rope 2018; International environmental NGO 2018; FoEE 2018 b). This coalition 
seemingly caught the attention of  people and decision-makers precisely because it 
was cross-sectoral, thus involving social and green organizations, as well as actors 
of  other nature, that would not normally be expected to work together. 
 
“I think it is not a secret that unions and us have sometimes different views and I think that the 
pure fact that we reached out to each other and that we are [engaging] in a dialogue [with each 
other] to find solutions to a series of  social, economic and environmental problems, like energy 
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poverty, is appreciated. That clearly is a key to our successful advocacy. We could do it as indi-
vidual organizations, but with different success” (International environmental NGO 
2018). 
 
The pretext to found the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition was the publica-
tion of  the “Clean energy for All Europeans” legislative package. 2017 was a cru-
cial and unique time for the redefinition of  energy poverty policies in the Europe-
an Union. This raised the opportunity, if  not the need, for NGOs and trade un-
ions to influence legislation (Housing Europe 2018; FoEE 2018 a). Given that en-
ergy poverty is a multidimensional issue (FoEE 2018 a) and knowing that envi-
ronmental organizations were already working on the package, EAPN and ESPU 
decided from the start to involve green actors in the coalition. This choice allowed 
the alliance to be wide and heterogeneous and, hence, to increase its resources and 
its strength as a pressure group. The idea was to create a ‘political momentum’ 
around the package, by finding synergies between the demands of  social NGOs, 
trade unions and environmental NGOs (EPSU 2018). Ultimately, the cross-
sectoral nature of  the coalition grew out to be perceived as an added value, not 
only by external witnesses, but also by coalition members themselves.  
 
“The reason why we have joined the coalition was because the objective of  the coalition was to 
raise the point of  energy poverty in a cross-sectoral manner across different pieces of  legislation” 
(Housing Europe 2018). 
  
Even though some sees it as inevitable (International environmental NGO 2018) 
and all the organizations seem to welcome it (EPSU 2018), the heterogeneity of  
the coalition’s composition was not the principal reason why such a rassemblement 
was formed. It is clear that allying was primarily a functional - or strategic - choice 
for each organization, since their main concern was the effectiveness and/or the 
potential impact of  the coalition (EPSU 2018; EAPN 2018; International envi-
ronmental NGO 2018; Housing Europe 2018). This is reflected in the fact that 
the coalition, especially in the beginning, qualified as an ad-hoc form of  coopera-
tion (EAPN 2018). By keeping decision-making and internal management infor-
mal, the coalition has been able to carry out the work smoothly and effectively and 
to be impactful when needed. A more formalized structure would have perhaps 
forced coalition members to deal with their differences, hence questioning the 
soundness of  the alliance itself. 
 
5.3. INTERNAL MANAGEMENT 
   
Unlike other more formalized alliances, since the beginning, the Right to Energy for 
All Europeans coalition has functioned through an ad-hoc informal structure 
(Housing Europe 2018; EAPN 2018; EPSU 2018). This informal setting reflects 
how coalition partners approach decision-making.  
 
“Decision-making is very transparent, in the way that we have set up an e-mail list with everyone 
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subscribing to that. So, every direction, every position that the coalition proposes is shared with all 
members [with a view] to get wide support. [The process] is very transparent and open for contri-
butions” (International environmental NGO 2018).    
  
Thus, the coalition has opted for a transparent and horizontal approach to its in-
ternal management. Initially, coalition partners deliberately decided not to define a 
common terms of  reference, detailing the mandate of  the coalition, the require-
ments for membership and the division of  roles and responsibilities, nor they 
elected a coordinating group responsible for the guidance of  the coalition’s activity 
(EAPN 2018). This choice was due to either capacity reasons (EAPN 2018) or to 
make proceedings more effective and easier to manage (Housing Europe 2018). 
However, this changed in March 2018 when the coalition got funded. 
 
“At first it was really not formalized. […] But it just so happened that we got funded in the 
beginning of  the year and, so, I think that changed everything, because suddenly I was kind of  
mandated, as Friends of  the Earth Europe’s Campaigner, to talk on behalf  of  the coalition and 
since then we have Twitter and Facebook profiles and a website. We have also defined a terms of  
reference for me, so I have clear roles. Those are to coordinate the coalition and its initiatives and 
to support members’ activities on energy poverty” (FoEE 2018 b). 
 
Therefore, the alliance went from an initial phase, when it was an ad-hoc coopera-
tive effort aiming to influence the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package 
alone, to a more stable EU-wide grassroots movement, involving national net-
works and enlarging the scope of  its activities, while still functioning informally 
(EPSU 2018). 
Besides the leading role of  FoEE, the division of  responsibilities and tasks is de-
cided either during meetings or afterwards and it is made in an informal way:  
whoever can and wants to contribute volunteers to do so (EAPN 2018). The same 
applies to voting, which happens by consensus (EPSU 2018), and to the rules reg-
ulating membership requirements for organizations that wish to join the coalition, 
that are only asked to subscribe to the coalition’s demands (EPSU 2018). 
 
“[We adopt] a quite informal way of  working, but at the same time we try to have a quite dem-
ocratic process in the coalition. The idea is to be the most inclusive as we can and to create an in-
terest in the coalition, otherwise it is not going to work.” (EPSU 2018) 
 
Concretely, decisions are taken in an informal way during coalition’s meetings, 
which usually occur monthly, unless there is an incumbent occurrence that re-
quires more frequent encounters (FoEE 2018 a; EPSU 2018). Meetings are func-
tional and mainly focused on agreeing upon lobbying and awareness-raising activi-
ties and on how to deliver on such strategies (EAPN 2018). In between meetings, 
coalition members keep in touch through e-mail exchanges, which are useful to 
update partners on eventual progresses (International environmental NGO 2018; 
Housing Europe 2018; EPSU 2018).  
The result of  this horizontal and informal approach to decision-making and re-
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sponsibilities is that some actors have ended up being more active than others. 
Even though the coalition was initially created by EAPN and EPSU, it is generally 
recognized that, over the time, FoEE has taken a leading role alongside EPSU 
(EPSU 2018; EAPN 2018; Housing Europe 2018; International environmental 
NGO 2018; FoEE 2018 b). The prominence of  Friends of  the Earth Europe in-
creased even more when one of  its staff  members got funded by ECF to dedicate 
part of  her working hours specifically to the coalition (FoEE 2018 b; EPSU 2018).  
If  environmental organizations’ commitment to the coalition was fundamental to 
deliver on the common agenda, on the other hand, social NGOs have contributed 
relatively less and they have provided fewer inputs to the activities (International 
environmental NGO 2018; FoEE 2018 b). EAPN (2018), calling for a better bal-
ancing between social and environmental organizations within the coalition, 
blames a lack of  resources and capacity for social NGOs’ scarce dedication to the 
coalition.  
As already stated, the informal way of  working has been seen as an incentive for 
organizations to join, because they can contribute to coalition’s activities and deci-
sions, relying on the fact that other coalition partners will carry out most of  the 
work on behalf  of  the group, hence minimizing individual human and economic 
costs and saving their often-scarce resources (EPSU 2018; ETUC 2018; Housing 
Europe 2018). However, the more informal internal management and decision-
making are, the harder it is for coalitions to broaden the scope without compro-
mising their members’ own interests. 
 
 “I do not think [a more formalized setting would be more beneficial]. In the past, I have been 
involved with the Spring Alliance, which was an attempt to organize the same conversation in a 
more structured way. Actually, for very pragmatic reasons, I do not think [the Spring Alliance] 
was very successful. Coordination costs were too high. All the organizations have to cope with the 
same funding problems, limited human resources, [confusion around the] policy agenda […]. If  
on the top of  that we create a kind of  monster to structure the discussion among Civil Society 
Organizations, it might be counter-productive! So, I think that the way we have been working for 
the last five years is the most appropriate one. We have ad-hoc collaboration when it make sense, 
when we have a common interest, when we have the resources. Our priority is to maximize the 
impact we can have together on a series of  very specific demands. The Spring Alliance approach 
was more top-down […]. It helps to be more targeted [and] more focused on some specific de-
mands” (ETUC 2018). 
 
Therefore, informal management helps alliances to be more effective in delivering 
on a pre-determined agenda, while at the same time, making sure that unification 
does not happen, i.e. that the specificity of  each organization’s values, mission and 
nature are safeguarded and not undermined by being part of  a coalition (EPSU 
2018).  
 
 
5.4. THE COALITION’S STRATEGY TO INFLUENCE EU’S LEGISLATION ON 
ENERGY POVERTY 
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With respect to the strategy followed by the Right to Energy for All Europeans coali-
tion, the first step was to coagulate all the different organizations around some key 
policy demands addressing the eradication of  energy poverty (EPSU 2018). These 
demands, which would be later formalized in a list of  seven recommendations for 
policymakers, are general enough to be shared by all partners unanimously (Hous-
ing Europe 2018). They are also crosscutting enough to ensure consensus (EPSU 
2018) and a win-win situation for both social and green actors within the coalition 
(EAPN 2018; International environmental NGO 2018), because they seek to push 
policymakers to recognize both the social and environmental implications of  en-
ergy policies (FoEE 2018 a; FoEE 2018 b). 
 
“I think this kind of  campaigns work [best] on general issues. This is how you work: you come 
to look at what the common issues are, you agree on common statements or principles and then 
you allow people to speak separately” (EAPN 2018). 
 “The coalition so far is not really a lobbying machine with precise demands [and] ready to advo-
cate also for multiannual frameworks or similar provision. This is something that we have put 
together because it is important to give some arguments in favor of  having a pragmatic, ambitious 
and cost-efficient legislation on energy at the EU level” (Housing Europe 2018). 
 
The coalition’s lobbying activity has so far mostly been concentrated upon the 
“Clean Energy for all Europeans” legislative package, which is a reasonable choice, 
since the package “will define the EU’s energy policy for the next crucial decade” 
(FoEE 2018 a). Having mostly the same assessment of  the situation regarding en-
ergy poverty in Europe (EPSU 2018), the organizations joined forces to put a 
spotlight on energy poverty within the package and to make sure that policymak-
ers would take into account the social implications of  EU energy policies, by de-
signing appropriate measures to alleviate energy poverty in Europe (FoEE 2018 a; 
International environmental NGO 2018).   
 
 “In terms of  policy objectives, what we wanted to do, as I said, was to show where energy poverty 
can be an issue in the different pieces of  legislation. So, we did not come up with recommenda-
tions or a clear view on what we wanted to achieve in terms of  concrete policy measures. […] 
There was more the idea that the coalition should help to increase visibility and raise the aware-
ness of  stakeholders on the fact that [the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package] is not 
only about technical legislation, but also [about] social aspects and impacts on energy poverty” 
(Housing Europe 2018). 
 
Therefore, the coalition’s strategy aimed at formulating political demands, recom-
mendations and proposals that had to be both concrete (ETUC 2018) - i.e. appli-
cable to the “Clean energy for all Europeans” legislative package and to the issue 
of  energy poverty - and universal (Housing Europe 2018) - i.e. not detailed and 
valid beyond the current political context. This means that, even though these de-
mands were formulated in light of  the actual legislative proposals in the “Winter 
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Package”, they do not address the details of  the texts of  these proposals. Interest-
ingly, prior to the coalition setup, EAPN and EPSU drafted a set of  amendments 
applicable to the provisions regarding energy poverty in the European Commis-
sion’s initial proposal for package, but when the two organizations expanded their 
alliance to other actors, the amendments were dropped.  
 
As stated before with respect to the coalition’s view on the package, coalition 
partners seemed to share similar negative views on the package (EPSU 2018; 
FoEE 2018 a; EAPN 2018). 
 
“We believe that [the proposed package] does not adequately tackle energy poverty. The language 
is often imprecise, as it leaves Member States the choice to tackle energy poverty or not and to de-
fine it. We wish to make [the definition of] energy poverty and the specific policy measures to 
tackle it mandatory. Also, we believe it’s necessary to roll out massive renovation programs across 
Europe to tackle climate change and energy poverty jointly” (FoEE 2018 a). 
 
Therefore, the coalition followed closely the legislative processes related to the 
various pieces of  legislation in  the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package 
that have a relevance for energy poverty, attempting to influence the processes 
themselves. First, the alliance concentrated upon the RED, the Governance Regu-
lation and the EED, obtaining an increase in the energy efficiency target relatively 
to the EU Commission’s initial proposal, as well as the mainstreaming of  energy 
poverty concerns in measures regarding energy efficiency and renewable energy 
communities (FoEE 2018 b).  
Then, it concentrated on the Energy Directive and Regulation, pushing for the in-
clusion of  a definition of  energy poverty and of  a binding ban of  disconnections 
for energy poor households. Despite attempting to drive public attention on the 
topic and being able to have some impact, the coalition was not satisfied with the 
ultimate legislative outcome, mainly because it lacks strong binding obligations for 
Member States to alleviate energy poverty (EPSU 2018; FoEE 2018 b). 
 
With respect to the actual activities the coalition has carried out in order to deliver 
on its strategy, the alliances opted for a classic advocacy campaign (EPSU 2018). 
 
“It is a classic campaign […] It is an advocacy campaign, which means that, on one hand, you 
lobby European decision-makers […]. Then also we have organized a series of  public events 
[…]. Of  course, we have our regular meetings - internal ones […] - but that is for the internal 
coordination. And also we have the communication activities” (EPSU 2018). 
 
On the one hand, the advocacy campaign translates into lobbying activities, aimed 
at getting in touch with policymakers to urge them to support coalition’s demands 
(EPSU 2018). Such activities include bilateral meetings with MEPs or their assis-
tants, as well as with Permanent Representatives, and writing and mainstreaming 
policy deliverables - such as letters or policy briefing - for EU decision-makers 
(EPSU 2018). These exchanges are organized with a view to grasp relevant infor-
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mation about the ongoing legislative process and, at the same time, to feed the 
process itself  with the coalition’s position (International environmental NGO 
2018).  On the other hand, the advocacy campaign also attempts to raise public 
awareness on the coalition’s policy demands. This second strand of  activities have 
mainly taken the shape of  public events, usually held in institutional venues and 
co-organized with legislators. Finally, the communication activity of  the coalition, 
acting through its social media accounts, through its website and by writing a series 
of  publications on energy poverty - mainly op-eds for the Euractive website – 
complement its advocacy actions (EPSU 2018). 
Besides the campaign structured around the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” 
package, the coalition has also defined an action plan for its future activities. In the 
short term, the coalition is planning to direct its focus towards opportunities for 
further EU legislation on energy poverty and monitoring the actual implementa-
tion of  the package, for example by working on projects dedicated to national en-
ergy poverty definitions (Housing Europe 2018). This means that the coalition will 
mostly adopt a concrete approach to work. In this way, the activities should be 
even more consensual, given that they would not have to address those obligations 
and restrictions that are usually contained in legislative measures. Targeted obliga-
tions and restrictions are, in fact, likely to generate conflicts, given that what might 
benefit one’s interest could be detrimental to others’ (Housing Europe 2018). 
However, work related to legislation will not be the only way forward for the Right 
to Energy for All Europeans coalition. The goals for the upcoming period will be the 
following: to strengthen the coalition, by pursuing alignment and trust building, 
and to further build a network involving national organizations (FoEE 2018 b). 
With respect to specific action points, the Coalition has already agreed to work on 
EU budgets and on the 2019 European elections, by attempting to make sure that 
party manifestos will include energy poverty (FoEE 2018 b). It will also try to in-
fluence the priorities of  the next European Commission, it will lobby Eurostat to 
keep monitoring energy poverty in the Union and it will issue a report on a new 
index on energy poverty (FoEE 2018 b). 
 
5.5. AGREEMENT, DISAGREEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
   
As already stated, in an attempt to build a common advocacy strategy, the partner 
organizations of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition initially gathered to 
outline their priorities with respect to the alleviation of  energy poverty in Europe 
and then they managed to agree on a set of  common policy recommendations 
(EAPN 2018). The seven demands presented in the previous paragraphs thus rep-
resent the common ground for coalition members, i.e. those priorities that they 
have all been able to jointly promote (FoEE 2018 a; International environmental 
NGO 2018).  
Different interest groups have different priorities when it comes to energy poverty, 
determined by what their core interest are and by the demands that their members 
raise with respect to energy poverty. Each organization tends to consider mostly 
the implication of  any political issues for its core interest or for its members 
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(Housing Europe 2018). When working in alliances, they try to bring their exper-
tise and priorities to the discussion, hoping, or even pushing for the coalition to 
take their claims on board. The result is not necessarily to “water down” (Housing 
Europe 2018) the coalition’s proposals. It might rather be the one to “put a bit of  
reality check in the overall discussion” (Housing Europe 2018). Indeed, all these 
different views inform common goals and proposals, thus pushing the alliance to 
adopt a more comprehensive view.  
 
“[We are] making an effort in the coalition to highlight renewable energies and [the needs of] en-
ergy citizens and energy communities. […] Our motivation is to fight energy poverty with renew-
able energy and with ownership of  electricity production by the people, putting poor households in 
the center of  energy transition and not marginalizing them. I think that will remain our organi-
zation’s continued input in the coalition” (International environmental NGO 2018). 
 
The coalition’s demands need to be shared unanimously and they shall not be con-
tradictory with organizations’ own values. Collective priorities do not have to nec-
essarily coincide with individual priorities, they just have to be coherent with them 
(Housing Europe 2018). It is convenient for organizations to support the coalition 
in the promotion of  a common multidimensional agenda. Each organization in-
deed remains free to express its point of  view, both in external activities and inter-
nally, i.e. in the discussions that take place within coalition’s meetings (EAPN 
2018).  
 
“Many demands [by the coalition] are not necessarily issues on which our members have an opin-
ion, but we are happy to support the coalition with these demands, because they will improve the 
overall policy environment, legislative framework and, also, living conditions for people” (Hous-
ing Europe 2018). 
 
Reaching consensus is easier due to the fact that the recommendations put for-
ward by the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition for policymakers to improve 
the overall situation of  energy poverty in Europe are demands general enough for 
each organization to be willing to support them (Housing Europe 2018). These 
proposals are designed to influence specific legislative provisions without going 
into textual details. Going into details might prove hard and time-consuming for 
the alliance, given that the design of  energy policies have implications – in terms 
of  costs and benefits – for different interest groups. That is why the coalition has 
never actually discussed the amendments drafted by EAPN and EPSU for the 
“Clean Energy for All Europeans” package. It would have likely required such a 
wide and heterogeneous set of  lobbies to compromise the interests they represent, 
in order to find political agreement on policy details, because what might benefit 
one’s interest could be harmful for others’. Instead, the coalition has focused on a 
set of  clear and synthetic demands. Furthermore, agreement was perhaps made 
feasible by informal decision-making procedures, which allowed coalition partners 
to focus on what was consensual, while leaving out of  the discussion what was not 
(FoEE 2018 a; FoEE b). 
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 “Right at the beginning of  the coalition, we decided to […]focus on things that bring us togeth-
er: the seven demands we have outlined” (FoEE 2018 a). 
“The challenge was really to bridge [the gap between the] the social and the environmental agenda 
and the question was how [to do it]. We decided, as a coalition, to steer clear from this debate [on 
regulate prices, which was a controversial topic] and to promote some other solutions, particularly 
energy efficiency and renewable [energy].” (FoEE 2018 b) 
 
While they were able to identify a broad common denominator, coalition partners 
have admittedly conflicted on some key aspects related to energy poverty, perhaps 
the most salient one being energy prices. Before deciding to open their alliance to 
external subscriptions, EAPN and EPSU together demanded to “stop the phasing 
out of  regulated prices in the energy sector for domestic households and support 
social tariffs for vulnerable customers” (EAPN and EPSU 2017, 3). Unlike all 
their other demands, EPSU and EAPN’s proposal about regulated prices was the 
only one that the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition has not taken on board 
and this is explicitly recognized by coalition partners (EAPN 2018; FoEE 2018 a; 
FoEE b; International environmental NGO 2018; ETUC 2018; EPSU 2018). 
Social organizations and trade unions are supportive of  regulated prices in the en-
ergy sector, as they believe fighting the liberalization of  energy markets to be a 
fundamental tool to make energy services more affordable and more accessible for 
low-income people (FoEE 2018 b). Green NGOs, on the other hand, have reser-
vations when it comes to recognizing regulated prices as an appropriate solution to 
alleviate energy poverty. In their opinion, regulated prices could hinder the devel-
opment of  small-scale renewable energy projects (International environmental 
NGO 2018) and could end up boosting subsidies towards polluting forms of  en-
ergy (FoEE 2018 b). EAPN hypothesizes that green NGOs are reluctant to sup-
port pricing regulation, because that would result in an increase in energy con-
sumption, which would ultimately foster environmental degradation (EAPN 
2018). 
Therefore, one could argue that the case of  regulated prices shows that social and 
environmental organizations have different economic visions, with the latter being 
more market-oriented than the former (EAPN 2018). However, as it will be 
shown below, this does not seem to be the case. European social NGOs, trade un-
ions and environmental organizations mostly agree on their long-term vision for a 
just and sustainable world, in which wellbeing should have more relevance than 
economic growth (FoEE 2018 b; EPSU 2018; ETUC 2018). Therefore, the divide 
on regulated prices seems to be more a debate about short-term tactics to alleviate 
energy poverty, than about long-term strategies (ETUC 2018). 
 
“I think [that] if  you look at the portfolio of  instruments that public authorities have in their 
hands to fight energy poverty, there are short-term and long-term instruments. I think that all 
members of  the coalition will agree in saying that we first need to look at structural and long-
term instruments, like renovation of  public housing, or concrete support for tenants […]. We all 
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agree that this is something to be done, but it takes time […]. Sometimes the problems that the 
most vulnerable households face with their energy bills are really concrete and urgent, so you need 
[to display] all kinds of  instruments. Our position is not to say that regulated prices is the pana-
cea. What we are saying is that in some context, in some regions, or in some Member States, that 
specific instrument might help public authorities to cope with the [extremely] urgent situations 
where electricity prices, for any reasons, suddenly skyrocket. Then, you should be able, as a public 
authority, to cover the basic needs of  households – I don’t know, for the first 500 KW - ensuring 
that prices would be below that threshold, just to be sure that people will be able to heat and en-
lighten their homes properly” (ETUC 2018). 
  
The coalition main strategy to cope with conflicts has been to open spaces for dis-
cussion about eventual points of  disagreement (EAPN 2018; International envi-
ronmental NGO 2018). Even though in some cases – like for regulated prices - 
these discussions did not help solving the conflicts, dialogue is perceived in a posi-
tive way by coalition partners. Each organization is given the possibility to bring its 
instances to the attention of  their coalition partners and to promote their point of  
view, while recognizing the others’ too. When common understanding is too chal-
lenging, the coalition delists the controversial topic from its political program 
(FoEE 2018 a; International environmental NGO 2018; EPSU 2018). The way 
conflict resolution is managed is thus ad-hoc, meaning that each issue is treated 
separately and not following precise rules (EAPN 2018). 
Despite the presence of  unsolved conflicts and the relative lack of  detail in the 
agreed demands, the members of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition 
generally seem not to give too much relevance to disagreements. Conversely, many 
members perceive a cooperative atmosphere (Housing Europe 2018; FoEE 2018 
b) and major conflicts have not emerged since the initial period. This positive at-
mosphere could be explained by looking at the informality of  decision-making 
and procedures, which perhaps allow coalition members to have open and demo-
cratic discussions and to ignore conflicts if  they find appropriate not to discuss 
them. 
 
 “Despite the differences, I am not aware of  any strong disagreement. Actually, I think it was 
Friends of  the Earth that came up with this proposal [for the demands] and we all agreed basi-
cally from the beginning” (Housing Europe 2018).  
  
  
 
6. COMPARING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS 
 
Because the present research is attempting to assess whether and how coordina-
tion between social and environmental interest groups is feasible, it would be es-
sential to briefly sketch differences and similarities between the two types of  or-
ganizations. 
   
6.1. SYMMETRICAL VALUES & THE RISE OF JUST TRANSITION DISCOURSES 
WP-LPF 1/19 • ISBN 978-88-94960-13-6 48 
   
Needless to say, each interest group is devoted to the promotion of  specific prin-
ciples and values. However, when it comes to their visions, many similarities 
emerge, not just between organizations operating in the same sphere, but also be-
tween social and environmental ones. Their principles are determined by the inter-
est they represent and such interests also shape their political priorities. Nonethe-
less, many trade unions and NGOs have committed, at least in principle, to an 
overarching sustainable agenda (FoEE 2018 a; FoEE 2018 b; EAPN 2018) and 
some of  them have even engaged in policy areas which would not normally be 
considered as their prerogative (EPSU 2018; Housing Europe website). This has 
allowed some of  these organizations to work in a cross-sectoral manner, address-
ing the multifaceted implications of  their core interests. 
 
 “[EAPN commits] to a social and sustainable European and Global agenda since 2010. It 
has always been an important part of  [EAPN] key objectives: [promoting] a transformative 
social and sustainable agenda” (EAPN 2018). 
“I think that is really part of  Friends of  the Earth’s uniqueness [the fact] that we have always 
from the start linked social and environmental issues together. There has been this movement 
among environmentalism, for which you have to focus on abstract nature, animals and science. I 
think that seems very far away from people’s concerns in their everyday lives. Our position has 
always been to say that humans are part of  the environment and that social inequalities are 
translated into environmental inequalities. For example, we know that low-income families have 
less access to energy and that they usually live in highly polluted areas, even though they pollute 
less. It is not the same to go through a climate catastrophe if  you are a millionaire or poor” 
(FoEE 2018 b). 
“Of  course we are a trade union organization, so we mainly focus on the issues that are im-
portant for workers. Since five or ten years, we have started a big movement, which is called ‘no 
jobs in a dead planet’. So now we are focusing a lot on environmental aspects, on climate policies 
and on making sure that the EU is very ambitious when it comes to decarbonization policies” 
(EPSU 2018). 
 
Despite many NGOs and trade unions seem to be committed to the same values, 
a closer look highlights that they probably do so from different perspectives and 
for different, yet specular, reasons. We could argue that their values are symmet-
rical, in the sense that they look similar and they embrace the same holistic sus-
tainable vision for the world, but only because this is coherent with their core 
goals.  
 
“Even though we are an environmental organization, we share of  course a lot of  values with so-
cial NGOs and in the past, in many occasion, we have closely worked together. We support each 
other in mobilizing. […] At the end of  the day, it is clear for our organization that it is about 
people and the planet. We do not work for the sake of  the planet [alone]. We work on the planet 
for the benefit of  citizens” (International environmental NGO 2018). 
“Friends of  the Earth Europe has always been committed to environmental justice, which bridges 
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the gap between historically collaborating closely with social movements. Points of  disagreements 
can exist for specific policy recommendations, but we agree with the underlying principles of  pro-
gressive social organizations” (FoEE 2018 a). 
 
Values look so similar because, by endorsing a sustainable holistic vision for the 
world (Housing Europe website; EAPN 2018; FoEE 2018 a; FoEE 2018 b), they 
are designed in a way that envisages multiple goals - social, environmental and 
economic ones. Therefore, NGOs and trade unions have an incentive to commit 
to sustainable overarching values, because such values are coherent with – or even 
include - their core claims. Moreover, such organizations seem to be even more 
willing to subscribe to a certain political principle if  this benefits more interests 
than simply their members’ (FoEE 2018 b; International environmental NGO 
2018).  
When it comes to concretely applying overarching sustainability, if  some organiza-
tions engage with cross-sectoral advocacy activities (EPSU 2018; FoEE 2018 a; 
FoEE 2018 b), others find it hard to translate principles into actions, given that 
they are mainly focused on their core priorities (EAPN 2018) and, thus, they do 
not have the capacity to implement sustainability in their daily work.  
To sum up, NGOs and trade unions’ priorities are determined by the mandate that 
each organization is assigned by its own members. The nature of  their constituen-
cies determine the nature of  their claims and the nature of  the whole organization 
as well. Most of  these organizations commit to sustainable principles that take in-
to account both social and environmental performance goals. However, on con-
crete issues there could be conflicts between the priorities of  social and environ-
mental actors. 
Disagreement between social and environmental actors is frequent (FoEE 2018 a) 
and it occurs any time their priorities clash. These conflicts occur whenever there 
is a trade-off  between social priorities and environmental ones. Trade-offs are of-
tentimes linked to the different economic vision of  social NGOs, trade unions 
and green NGOs, which might cause them to part their ways on concrete political 
issues, but also on a more ideal level. If  social NGOs and trade unions generally 
take issue with an economic model that fosters unbounded growth and laissez-fair 
market economy, the same is not necessarily valid for many environmental civil 
society organizations (EPSU 2018; EAPN 2018). 
 
“Some of  [the green NGOs] do not have problems at all with [economic] growth, they just want 
it to be green; they see nothing wrong with money, they just want them to be green money; or they 
see nothing wrong with inequality, [they just push for] making it green. But that is not valid for 
all of  them, one should not [make generalizations] about who is what. I did not realize it so 
much that there are quite big differences” (EAPN 2018). 
 
However, such a divide between the social and the environmental worlds might 
have been the norm in previous years. More recently, the pattern seems to be shift-
ing, at least at the EU level. There has been much more awareness among NGOs 
and trade unions about the fact that social and environmental issues are linked 
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(FoEE 2018 b). Green organizations are pushing policymakers to consider the so-
cial implications of  environmental policies and viceversa (EPSU 2018). At the EU 
level, this was made possible by the fact that more and more of  these organiza-
tions – social NGOs, trade unions and green NGOs – have started to endorse the 
concept of  ‘just transition’, as a guiding principle for their activities (FoEE 2018 b; 
EPSU 2018; ETUC 2018). This principle has allowed them to go beyond the clas-
sical socio-environmental divide, by advocating instead for a paradigm that could 
be simultaneously socially and environmentally just and sustainable (FoEE 2018 
b), hence making it a win-win situation (EPSU 2018). There is an incentive for 
both social and environmental political actors to promote just transition and work 
together. Indeed, by creating social acceptance for policies that could contrast en-
vironmental degradation without hurting the population and workers dispropor-
tionally, an environmentally friendly transition might actually happen quicker 
(EPSU 2018), because societal actors would not resist it (FoEE 2018 b). Another 
implication of  endorsing the just transition paradigm is that social and environ-
mental organizations can be on the same page with respect to the economic 
sphere, unlike what many used to think. Just transition means contrasting the cur-
rent neo-liberal economic model, with a view to correct the social inequalities and 
the detrimental effects on the environment that such a model would create (EPSU 
2018; FoEE 2018 b). Just transition questions production and consumption sys-
tems that are structurally wasteful and hurting the Planet and societies and it at-
tempts to shift the focus from growth – including green growth, which many 
business organizations endorse – to wellbeing and human needs (FoEE 2018 b). 
 
“As far as I can say, the biggest green NGOs in Brussels – WWF, Friends of  the Earth, 
Greenpeace, Climate Action Network – are much more on the ‘just transition’ paradigm than 
on the ‘green growth’ one. Within these constituencies, you have differences among organizations, 
but, I think, none of  them is [supporting] a market approach. […] [Social and environmental 
organizations] might still have diverging views on some specific issues, but I really believe that we 
are much beyond the classical divide ‘jobs versus environment’. At the national level, you still 
have that simplistic divide, but at the EU level and in many Countries it is not really relevant 
anymore” (ETUC 2018). 
 
6.2. DIFFERENT WORKING METHODS 
   
Social and green organizations’ working methods share some similarities. First, 
these organizations all have a network of  members to coordinate and take inputs 
form and they all work to influence EU policymaking. Their typical activities range 
from lobbying to campaigning, from awareness-raising to research and exchange 
(EAPN website; FoEE website; Housing Europe website; ETUC website; EPSU 
website).  
Several organizations also recognize the existence of  some differences in the way 
social and environmental interest groups work: 
 
“You feel that when you meet them, that they are different. You are like Venus and Mars. So, 
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you need to take the time to understand each other and respect each other and then you can have 
trust to build something. It is not so easy, there has to be commitment to work things through and 
to get a common aim” (EAPN 2018). 
 “Of  course, we are a campaigning organization, not a think-tank and we have different ways 
and means on hands to carry out our campaigns. That is sometimes different or adding to, the 
ways and means of  social movements or unions” (International environmental NGO 
2018). 
 
Actually, strategies and techniques vary considerably from one organization to an-
other and there seems to be a pattern, when it comes to methods of  working, sep-
arating the social and the environmental sectors. Environmental organizations 
tend to employ younger staff  members in their offices and they seemingly have 
more skills about technology and social networks than social NGOs (EAPN 
2018). Green actors also make use of  campaigning more than social ones do and 
some of  them even consider campaigning as their principal activity (International 
environmental NGO 2018). Many environmental organizations have a network 
that expands beyond the borders of  the EU and Europe (International environ-
mental NGO 2018). This does not only mean that NGOs’ European offices often 
work on global projects and issues, but also that these offices are considered more 
like local branches than headquarters. Moreover, green NGOs lobby the European 
Parliament and MEPs more frequently than social ones and, as a result, they tend 
to have sounder connections with people working in that institution (EAPN 
2018).  
Social NGOs concentrate their lobbying activities more on soft laws and coordi-
nated strategies, than on hard laws (FoEE 2018 b) and they tend to work more 
closely with the European Commission. Nevertheless, the European Commission 
seems more keen to ally with environmental NGOs than with social ones, perhaps 
because it is seeking support from civil society organizations on its climate and 
ecological agenda (EAPN 2018). Finally, environmental organizations tend to con-
centrate more on influencing public opinion, if  compared to social actors (EAPN 
2018).  
All these differences in means and expertise (International environmental NGO 
2018) may actually contribute to create two opposite cultures (EAPN 2018), which 
raises the question of  which factors have contributed to this separation. A first el-
ement to consider is that EU environmental and social policies have historically 
developed in opposite ways. 
 
“I think the other element to take into account is hard and soft law. That is really crucial. The 
social area, particularly our side of  the social area, is mainly about soft law and that implies a 
completely different way of  working” (EAPN 2018). 
 
As a result, environmental organizations have developed more skills to lobby bind-
ing pieces of  legislation, mostly leaving behind the work on soft law measures, 
which social NGOs are usually highly involved with (EAPN 2018). Furthermore, 
this could also explain why green actors are more accustomed to work with mem-
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bers of  the European Parliament, that hold proper legislative powers, while social 
ones tend to work more with the European Commission, which is in charge of  
coordinated strategies. 
Another element of  difference among the two worlds is funding. Some social lob-
bies are funded directly by the European Commission, whereas environmental 
NGOs rely more on donations, crowd-funding initiatives and contributions from 
their members (EAPN 2018). This has implications for the nature of  these organ-
izations and for their relationships with EU institutions.  
Finally, the socio-environmental cultural difference seems to be determined also 
by divergences at the local and national levels. Social interest groups are normally 
more member-driven than environmental NGOs. They come from the culture of  
social services (EAPN 2018) or employees’ representation. Their goal is usually to 
work for and alongside their members, focusing a lot on participation and on the 
involvement of  underrepresented groups of  people as stakeholders (EAPN 2018). 
Therefore, social organizations work in support of  - and to deliver on - their 
members’ interests, whereas, in the environmental sector, the opposite seems to be 
more likely: members subscribe and fund an organization, so that it can develop 
and carry on its own agenda. That is perhaps the reason why green NGOs have 
more expertise around campaigns and crowd-funding initiatives and why they 
work more on public opinion, making more use of  new technologies. 
In the description above, social NGOs and trade unions have been treated as simi-
lar entities, since they both work mainly on social issues and represent the claims 
of  societal actors. However, several differences exist between trade unions and so-
cial NGOs, rising from the fact that they are organizations of  different nature. 
Trade unions are usually more institutionalized than NGOs, given that social part-
ners are better embedded in EU policymaking than civil society (EPSU 2018). 
They have larger networks and complex internal structures, which give rise to 
strict and highly formalized mandates (EPSU 2018). Finally, perhaps due to a rela-
tively higher abundance of  resources, trade unions tend to work not only on social 
and employment policies, but also on several other policy areas, such as taxes or 
energy (EPSU 2018), which is not equally frequent for NGOs. Thus, they are 
more accustomed to work on hard laws than social NGOs. 
If  such a “difference of  culture” (EAPN 2018) really separates the social and the 
environmental worlds – but also NGOs and trade unions - when they intend to 
work together, interest groups need to identify common aims and to build trust 
and understanding through dialogue, so as to overcome stated differences (Inter-
national environmental NGO 2018). This so-called cultural difference could be 
seen as a factor that caused the Right to Energy for All European coalition to adopt a 
lighter and informal setting. Indeed, informality allows the coalition to deliver on 
its programs and plans in an effective and timely way, while creating a space for an 
open and democratic exchange of  opinions, with a view to tie these different cul-
tures together. 
 
“I think we are going to keep moving cautiously. I think it is good to keep following people’s 
rhythm and capacity, because a lot of  the social NGOs [in the coalition] do not have much ca-
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pacity to work on [the coalition’s activities]. Social policy is Member States’ competence and so, 
when I talk to social organizations, they tell me that they are not used to work on hard law and 
directives. They work on the [European] Semester especially. So, it is very overwhelming to sud-
denly [have to deal with] all these directives and a different way of  working, [for example imply-
ing] meeting with MEPs directly and getting amendments in [the legislation]. Usually that is not 
how they work, or how they are used to. So, I would say that has been kind of  a challenge [for 
the coalition], to make sure that social NGOs understand the process and [know] where we are 
going and how we work. So, I think we are taking it one step at the time basically” (FoEE 
2018 b). 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
   
The analysis of  the experience of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition has 
shed a light on some key aspects related to green-red mobilization, i.e. to the joint 
mobilization of  social and environmental interest groups at the EU level.  
 
The coalition is an ensemble of  organizations created primarily for strategic rea-
sons. Such organizations normally lack the time and resources to work outside of  
their mandate. Considering the efficiency gains of  working through alliances, by 
joining them, interest groups have the opportunity to minimize their efforts and 
still manage to be impactful on policymaking with their proposals. 
The Right to Energy for All Europeans alliance could be classified initially as a form 
of  ad-hoc cooperation and, while it has more recently attempted to go beyond its 
ad-hoc agenda, it still maintains an informal setting to this day. Keeping such an 
informal functional architecture can be understood either as a consequence of  the 
strategic rationale behind the coalition - given that simplified proceedings favor 
timely and effective delivery - or as the inevitable by-product of  mixing the two 
cultures existing in the social and in the environmental spheres at the EU level.  
 
Both green and social pressure groups seem to commit to a similar multidimen-
sional sustainable agenda, but they do so from symmetrical perspectives. The pri-
mary goal of  each of  these organizations is to represent a specific interest, or a 
particular group of  people. They do not problems in committing to an overarch-
ing agenda, because this agenda usually takes into account their core interest as 
well. When they want to work together on specific policy issues, such as energy 
poverty, conflicts may emerge in how lobbies concretely apply sustainability to 
their policy demands. In the case of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition, 
trade unions and NGOs have used dialogue to identify common goals and to 
build trust and understanding.  
As a result, common demands have to be multidimensional, hence benefiting all 
the interests involved. This often implies that agreement would be easier to reach 
the least detailed the proposals are. Also, when lobbies’ fundamental priorities di-
verge on a specific issue, it is usually hard for them to come up with a synthesis. 
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Conflicts are normally handled through internal discussions and consequently 
downplayed, as alliances concentrate more on supporting agreed – thus, consensu-
al - issues and goals.  
  
Full cooperation between social and environmental interest groups at the Europe-
an level is undermined by their potentially divergent interests and by the complex 
structures they operate in. Despite a widespread cooperative attitude and the sev-
eral benefits that coordination may bring, joint mobilization does not display its 
full potential. Forms of  cooperation may be created and may also become effec-
tive lobbying machines, but each organization sits at the alliance’s table primarily to 
represent its own interest. This means that organizations maintain their individual-
ity and they are open to cooperate if  and only if  this is in line with their mandate 
and it is overall convenient for them to join.  
 
Furthermore, the highly structured context and the constraints in which lobbies 
normally operate also hinder full cross-sectoral coordination, making it more con-
venient for them to work through ad-hoc and informal structures. Scarce re-
sources only allow lobbies to allocate such resources to ad-hoc and targeted advo-
cacy strategies, whereas the compartmentalization of  EU policymaking gives rise 
to ‘silos’ and to cultural differences between European interest groups that work 
on different policy areas, making cross-sectoral mobilization more difficult to 
achieve.  
Therefore, the prevalence of  immediate interests and the complexity of  lobbies’ 
structures justify the presence of  informal cooperative structures, the fact that 
common positions are not detailed and that conflicts are not solved.  
 
However, EU-level cooperation among interest groups is not only weak between 
social and environmental actors, but also among organizations of  the same type. 
So, what role should NGOs and trade unions play in solving the eco-social-growth 
trilemma? Can green-red cooperation go beyond its current constrictions?  
 
Full coordination – i.e. a form of  coordination that goes beyond the above-stated 
constraints - would still not be sufficient for trade unions and NGOs to solve eco-
social disputes, such as the one related to regulated prices in the energy market 
that emerged within the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition. The issue of  en-
ergy prices shows that pursuing simultaneously the three performance goals of  
sustainability may sometimes be impossible. Environmental and social priorities 
potentially clash in several different policy contexts, in the framework of  the eco-
social-growth trilemma. It is the political sphere, composed by actors responsible 
for policy demand and supply, that has the duty to channel different priorities and 
evaluate the various trade-offs among them. To deliver on such trade-offs, political 
actors have to endorse ideal constructs, which can guide them in the quest to rec-
oncile social, environmental and economic priorities. While EU institutions, re-
sponsible for policy outcomes, seem to have given priority to economic and finan-
cial goals, to the detriment of  ecological and social sustainability, the opposite atti-
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tude characterizes social and green pressure groups at the EU level. Such organiza-
tions have carried out a sustainable narrative. Unlike EU institutions, NGOs and 
trade unions are seemingly going beyond the discourse on sustainability, as they 
are more and more frequently endorsing the “just transition” concept, which pro-
vides a theoretical framework to deliver on eco-social goals.    
Through just transition, European NGOs and trade unions have become more 
aware of  the links between the social and the environmental worlds and they have 
been able to find a common ground, attempting to go beyond the divides that tra-
ditionally existed between these worlds. By reinforcing each other’s demands, they 
seem to be willing to build a cross-sectoral consensus for a developmental model 
focused on well-being and human needs – instead of  growth -, which should favor 
social justice and cohesion, while also attempting to reverse environmental degra-
dation.  
The key aspect is that just transition is different from sustainability. On the one 
hand, just transition provides a clear objective that is easier for lobbies to apply to 
concrete policy issues than sustainability, since it only prescribes the simultaneous 
satisfaction of  two out of  three performance goals. On the other, it is also a rather 
radical view, which unsurprisingly does not attract the support of  many economic 
interest groups and business. Going against powerful economic actors, pressure 
groups might not get the institutional support they would need for their policy 
demands to be taken on board and, thus, just transition might never actually trans-
late into political outcomes. Being aware of  this and reasoning strategically, as they 
normally do, NGOs and trade unions might hence decide not to go against such 
powerful interests and to concentrate on their core interests, instead of  multidi-
mensional objectives. 
 
Nonetheless, the case of  the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition appears as 
one of  the first attempts to promote social-ecological mobilization at the EU level. 
Members of  the coalition even provided recommendations to strengthen it and 
make it long-lasting, for example by involving national networks and broadening 
the scope of  the coalition beyond the ad-hoc work on the “Clean Energy for All 
Europeans” package. Moreover, on the one hand, NGOs and trade unions are 
possibly realizing that, against the backdrop of  pressing eco-social challenges, they 
cannot keep focusing on their immediate interests alone. Workers and societal ac-
tors are aware that climate shocks and environmental degradation are already af-
fecting people disproportionately, thus, they are progressively calling for a transi-
tion that would not be even more unjust. On the other hand, green organizations 
are realizing that they would not be able to implement a clean transition if  people 
will resisting it. 
 
To conclude, full green-red coordination is still far from happening. Divergent in-
terests and complex structures are likely to water down attempts to improve it. 
However, eco-social alliances may potentially have the strength and the resources 
to partly tackle and restructure established frameworks and interests, in the name 
of  a virtuous combination between social and ecological goals. 
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